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REALITY-CHALLENGED PHILOSOPHIES
OF PUNISHMENT
ROBERT WEISBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW SUBJECT OF MASS INCARCERATION
The American criminal justice system is arguably the most punitive
1
2
in the world today and the most punitive in American history. This
phenomenon has now acquired a dramatic name, mass incarceration,
meant to induce anxiety about the paradox (or about whether it is a
paradox) that the wealthiest and most powerful free-market democracy
imprisons such an anomalously high percentage of its population at a
time when crime itself is not one of the nation’s pressing social
3
problems.
Over the past decade, the humanities and social sciences have
yielded substantial literature examining the rise of mass incarceration
* Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr., Professor of Law, Stanford University; Director, Stanford
Criminal Justice Center. This Article is a revised and extended version of the George and
Martha Barrock Lecture on Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, which the
author gave at Marquette University Law School on October 6, 2011. My thanks to Hans
Anderson, Stanford J.D. 2014, for his superb assistance on this Article.
1. The American ratio of incarcerated people to total population is about seven times as
high as those of other industrialized democracies. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON
POPULATION LIST 1–3 tbls.1–2 (8th ed. 2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/
images/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. For slightly earlier figures, see BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 14 fig.1.2 (2006). Unless otherwise indicated in
this Article, numbers or rates for incarceration or imprisonment in the United States refer to
both prisons and jails.
2. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that the U.S. incarceration rate in 2003 was five
times the historical average over the period of 1925–1975).
3. Notions of “American exceptionalism” in regard to criminal justice have focused not
on incarceration (where the anomaly is fairly new) but on the long-term high-crime anomaly.
The perennial, if questionable, themes have been the power of the frontier and individualism
in our mythic self-conception, as well as history and consequences of slavery and, to a lesser
extent, late-nineteenth-century immigration. See DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM 1–4 (1998); Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence, and the Second
Amendment: American Character, Constitutionalism, and Crime, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 21–22,
29, 43 (2002). In recent years, as American crime rates have increasingly converged with
those in Europe, the focus on crime exceptionalism has been more about homicide than crime
generally, and even there, the gap is narrowing. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 51 (1997). In any
event, whether high crime can in turn explain high incarceration is itself highly questionable,
as discussed infra Part III.

15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

1204

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/18/2012 1:23 PM

[95:1203

from various perspectives, ranging from econometric analyses of
contributory factors to cultural critiques of American exceptionalism in
penal policy. At the same time, in an oddly parallel but disconnected
universe, legal and academic commentators have continued their long
engagement in jurisprudential debates about the purposes of
punishment (retribution, general and specific deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation). But mass incarceration has barely registered in
these debates.
Perhaps the key irony about this disconnected
parallelism is that the dominant theme in these jurisprudential debates
4
in the academic world has been a robust revival of retributivism, the
very rationale for punishment most associated with the specific legal
changes of recent decades that are the most obvious causes of the great
increase in incarceration. Indeed, even the many new robust critiques of
modern retributivism have only barely addressed the social costs created
by U.S. penal policy over the past four decades.
Amid the passionate controversy about the rise of mass
incarceration, some recent commentary helps us understand the
challenges that this phenomenon poses to conventional punishment
theory. I will orient my discussion around Punishment and Inequality in
America, by sociologist Bruce Western and co-researchers Leonard
Lopoo and Becky Pettit. Beyond its express mission of social science
analysis, this recent work seems also to serve as a call for the
embarrassment of our jurisprudence in light of the penal policies to
which this jurisprudence often lends aid and comfort. My discussion will
rely also on Michael Tonry and Franklin Zimring (and his frequent coauthor Gordon Hawkins), major scholars in the legal academy who have
bridged the unfortunate divide between legal academia (the home of
punishment jurisprudence) and criminology. Tonry’s timely new reader,
Why Punish? How Much?, usefully collects the classics of the field and
exemplars of some of the newer intellectual trends; thus Tonry can serve
as a running complement to Western and the other books on mass
5
incarceration. I rely on Zimring (and his frequent co-author Gordon
Hawkins) for a number of major empirical and policy studies that have
richly complicated our understanding of the supposed purposes of
American criminal punishment.

4. For a review of this revival, see Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The
Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845–46 & n.2 (2002).
5. Michael Tonry, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in WHY PUNISH? HOW
MUCH?: A READER ON PUNISHMENT 3, 3–4, 7 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) [hereinafter Tonry,
Introduction].
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There is at least a weak excuse for this disconnection between theory
and social fact regarding American incarceration. In their magisterial
1991 book, The Scale of Imprisonment, Zimring and Hawkins reviewed
the empirical challenge of explaining the incarceration rates of societies
and observed that “there is no necessary concordance between a
particular set of jurisprudential principles and the extent of the prison
6
population resulting from the application of those principles.” But this
empirical difficulty hardly exonerates those who place the rarefied
jurisprudence of punishment at the center of the academic world of
criminal justice at a time when the metastasis of punishment has become
a defining feature of their society.
It is worth placing Western’s book in the context of the great
proliferation of recent books about mass incarceration. Todd Clear
examines the removal of young men from inner-city neighborhoods,
which has perversely devastated social and family structures and
7
Anthony
reinforced criminal proclivities in some who remain.
Thompson looks at the back end of incarceration, examining how the
absence or failure of mental health care, drug counseling, and job
8
placement for released inmates exacerbates these tragic forces. Ruth
W. Gilmore attributes much of mass incarceration to a prison-building
9
boom enabled by surpluses of land, labor, and finance capital. Marie
Gottschalk views the “carceral state” and “penal populism” as
unintended consequences of social and political forces, including
progressive activism to combat sexual assault and domestic violence and
a weakened welfare state that makes victims’ rights advocates into law
10
enforcement allies. Taking an international and historical perspective,
James Whitman highlights the irony that European traditions of social
hierarchy forbade degrading punishments for high-status offenders and
this solicitude trickled down the social ladder. Comparatively, in
America, distrust of government power, aversion to hierarchy, and
6. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT, at xii
(1991).
7. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 86–87 (2007).
8. See ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES:
REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 1–2, 4, 7 (2008).
9. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 85–86 (2007).
10. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 77–79, 115 (2006); see also Marc Mauer, The Causes and
Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4, 4–6 (David Garland ed., 2001) (discussing the changes in
criminal justice policy that contributed to a rise in incarceration rates beginning in the 1970s).
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belief in individualism led to a crude egalitarianism of harsh
11
Also taking a comparative approach in his own
punishment.
monograph, Michael Tonry eschews any question-begging notion of a
unique American punitive culture. Instead he isolates the phenomenon
of “moral panic”—the sudden eruption of anger or fear, sometimes
sparked by a notorious violent crime, sometimes by an epidemic of
concern over a form of deviance-like drugs—that can lead to previously
12
unthinkable policies that are then perpetuated through legal inertia.
Some of the new major books on mass incarceration stand somewhat
apart from this eclectic set of commentaries. Works by David Garland13
14
and Jonathan Simon are in the tradition of grand social theory, linking
mass incarceration to seismic shifts in the ideology of our political
economy toward modern neoliberalism, and viewing our penal system as
a neoliberal instrument to control social disorder and manipulate the
15
16
labor economy. New books by Glenn Loury and Michelle Alexander
are passionate moral indictments of incarceration as the reproducer and
enforcer of racial caste lines.
Western’s book typifies the eclectic and more ground-level
approaches of the first set of new books and is perhaps the most
comprehensive and methodologically versatile among them. As for the
second group, although Western acknowledges the larger arc of
historical forces of the last century, he is cautious about broad claims of
social theory and ideology. While deeply sensitive to the racial
implications of the imprisonment boom, his research underscores that
income and education levels, while tragically inversely correlated with
race, are now emerging as the dominant predictors of the social
17
stratification wrought by incarceration.
On the surface, Western presents a fairly dry, statistically based
picture of incarceration in the United States, and he does not explicitly
11. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 11 (2003).
12. MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 85–96 (2004).
13. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, at x (2001).
14. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6 (2007).
15. See GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 10–11
(2008).
16. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 1–2 (2010).
17. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 11–12. He infers that the racial disparity in imprisonment
has gone down slightly in recent years, but that the class disparity has increased. Id. at 30–31.
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discuss theories of punishment. His primary concern is the economic
implications of modern American penal policy, and I stress the
deliberate ambiguity or vagueness of the term “implications” because it
usefully covers various permutations of cause and effect, as well as
merely suggestive associations. Western indicts modern penal policy as
a “systematic state influence on wages and employment” that
exacerbates social and economic inequality at a time when the urban
18
labor market for unskilled people is collapsing. Moreover, in a bizarre
irony that he explains in detail, American incarceration hides many of
its implications, because our statistical self-assessments of
unemployment and income exclude the prison population from their
19
denominators.
But Western is not concerned with ascribing malevolent intentions
to government or social hierarchy, nor, even in his formal statistical
analyses, does he commit himself to any overarching econometric
explanation of the cause of our incarceration rate. At times he proffers
some causal explanations, at times he refutes others’ overly confident
casual analyses, and at times he identifies striking correlations without
claiming their causal significance. Conversely, he is somewhat bolder in
proffering explanations of what mass incarceration itself has caused.
Western’s overall concern is what punishment means chiefly in the
sense of what punishment has done, and mainly what it has done is to
become the dominant social institution through which an increasing
number of poor Americans live their lives. As the self-reinforcing
consequence of certain short-term political governmental decisions and
prevalent social attitudes thirty years ago, prison and its aftermath
frame the lives of people as much as or more than does school, career,
or marriage. As a result, Western implicitly forces us to realize that our
standard litany of punishment theories is simply irrelevant to the reality
we confront. The penal system that Western documents has no rational
connection to either retributive (individual desert) theories of
punishment or deterrence or other consequentialist rationales. It is a
system that, deliberately or not, reinforces the economics and
demographics of diminished social status, and does so in reckless
disregard of its measurable consequences.
In Part II, relying on Western’s book and other sources, I review the
tragic demography of contemporary American incarceration, with its
drastic disproportions of young and less educated minority men. Part
18. Id. at xii.
19. Id. at 94–95.
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III reviews the most plausible explanations of the sharp upward curve of
the imprisonment rate in the last thirty years, noting specific legislative
changes and prosecutorial charging patterns, and some of the political
forces that may underlie them. Part IV then returns to Western to
examine the key social and economic consequences of the rise of
incarceration, most notably the lifetime earnings and employment
penalty that makes past incarceration a virtually permanent status for
millions of Americans. Part V then offers a brief review of modern
theories of punishment in our jurisprudence, concluding that the
dominant theories, most notably the newly robust retributivism, either
ignore the empirical realities of mass incarceration or address them only
in evasive and feckless ways. The Article concludes that both
deontological and utilitarian philosophies of punishment will founder in
irrelevance unless they accept some intellectual responsibility for
engaging the stubborn facts of a system of imprisonment they often
justify or enable.
II. THE DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN IMPRISONMENT
Almost 1% of the population of the United States is currently
behind bars. Another 2% is on parole or probation, and hence at risk of
20
incarceration (or reincarceration) at any time. The ratio of prisoners to
population is too crude a measure to allow meaningful comparisons
among nations, given differences in quality of statistics, crime
definitions, and administrative schemes. Nevertheless, the United
States is clearly an outlier not just among developed democracies (our
ratio of roughly 700 prisoners per 100,000 people is about six times
higher than the average for European Union nations) but among all
nations (Russia and South Africa trail slightly with about 600 and 400
21
prisoners per 100,000 people, respectively).
The composition of the U.S. prison population will surprise no one.
About 35% of prisoners are white, less than half the proportion in the
20. Over 4 million Americans are now on probation, LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P.
BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010
(2011), over 700,000 are in county or local jails, TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES (2011), and 1.5 million are in
federal or state prison, PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010
(2011). These absolute numbers have increased fourfold to fivefold in the last thirty years,
during which time the American population grew about 30%. See John Roman & Aaron
Chalfin, Does it Pay to Invest in Reentry Programs for Jail Inmates? 2–6 (The Urban Inst., Jail
Reentry
Roundtable
Initiative,
June
27–28,
2006)
available
at
http://www.urban.org/projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf.
21. WALMSEY, supra note 1, at 2 tbl.1, 3 tbl.2, 5 tbl.4.
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general population.
About 19% of the prison population is
denominated Hispanic, compared to 15% of the general population.
About 44% of the prison population is African-American, more than
22
three times the 12% share of the general population. From another
angle, Western notes that in 2000, 2.1% of all men aged eighteen to
sixty-five were incarcerated, but this imprisoned population represented
1.0% of white men, 3.3% of Hispanic men, and 7.9% of African23
American men. The racial disparity in incarceration greatly exceeds
24
that for unemployment, nonmarital child bearing, and infant mortality.
Western’s study also uncovered the independent significance of
education level. Western crunches the numbers this way and that way,
each statistical angle yielding progressively more depressing or even
terrifying insights. Joining education level to race, he looks at the
chances of members of a cohort going to jail or prison. Most starkly, in
2000, regardless of race, people without high school degrees were five
25
times more likely to be in prison than those with high school degrees;
and black men born in the 1960s who did not complete college were
twice as likely to have a prison record as they were to have military
26
service. By age 35, black men are more likely to have gone to prison
than received a college degree; black high school dropouts are more
likely to have a prison record than union membership; and non-college
27
black men are more likely to have a prison record than military service.
As we move down the educational ladder, and with a strong racial
22. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR
LATINO ORIGIN FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2000 tbl.1 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t9/tables/tab01.pdf
(providing
racial breakdown of U.S. population in 2000); Richard Willing, USA’s Prison Population a
Record, but Growth Slowing, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2004-11-07-women-prison_x.htm (providing racial composition of U.S. prison
population as of December 31, 2003).
23. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 17 tbl.1.1.
24. See id. at 16.
25. Id. at 73.
26. More specifically, if we look to Western’s later generation of men, men born
between 1965 and 1969 (the ones who matured during the biggest incarceration spike), as of
their thirty-fifth birthday, white men had a 3.2% chance of being incarcerated, a 31.6%
chance of completing college, a 14.0% chance of serving in the military, and a 72.5% chance
of getting married. Id. at 29. For black men of that generation, 22.4% had been in prison, as
opposed to 12.5% completing college, 17.4% joining in the military, and 59.3% being
married. If we focus solely on those who did not complete college, 6.0% of white men had
been in prison by age thirty-five, 73.5% had gotten a high school degree or GED, 13.0% had
served in the military, and 72.8% had married. For blacks, the respective numbers were a
31.9% chance of prison, a 64.4% chance of finishing high school, a 13.7% chance of military
service, and a 55.9% chance of marriage. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 19 tbl.1.2, 29 tbl.1.3.
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disproportion, prison becomes a “modal life event,” a tediously
predictable part of the condition of being an African-American man in
the United States.
III. CAUSES OF THE INCARCERATION BOOM
The above figures, especially those involving education level (and by
implication, economic status), might seem to have some causal
resonance, but Western offers them chiefly as straightforward statistical
demographic snapshots. Starting in the early 1970s, the index crime rate
increased, peaking at levels 100%–300% higher in the 1980s and early
1990s than in 1970, but has since dropped to a level equivalent to the
28
early 1970s. By contrast, the imprisonment rate has risen steadily over
the same period, and today remains roughly 400% higher than it was in
29
1970. The positive story should be that the incarceration increase of
the 1970s through the 1990s was caused by an increase in the crime rate,
while the post-1990 drop in the crime rate was caused by the increasing
incarceration rate. Both phases of this story are highly contestable.
The Scale of Imprisonment offered a global and historical review of
the data and the reasons why imprisonment rates may have little to do
30
with measurements of crime. For example, some large proportion of
crimes never lead to incarceration, and the gap surely increases when we
add contemporary drug crimes to the traditional index of serious crimes.
Additionally, public and political pressure can drive imprisonment,
often by legislating new crimes. This pressure is either indifferent to or
mischaracterizes the crime rate, and crime may be significantly
determined by the percentage of young males in the population, which
changes less quickly and severely than the imprisonment rate. Refining
these counterintuitive insights, Western observes that juvenile crime and
adult crime usually move together, and almost all adult criminals have
31
been juvenile offenders. So if the consistently upward direction of the
adult incarceration graph after 1980 were the result of more crime, we
should see a consistent rise in juvenile crime, with more youth involved
in the drug culture. But the data show a notable drop in almost all
32
categories of crime by American youth between 1980 and 2000.
28. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 39 fig.2.1.
29. Id.; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 49
fig.3.4 (2007) (showing the same trends from a normalized perspective, with 1975 levels set to
100).
30. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 6, at xii.
31. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 39.
32. Id. at 41 tbl.2.1.
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Obviously at some point more incarceration should reduce crime
33
through deterrence or incapacitation. While empirical findings have
varied on this question, the consensus is that the contribution of prison
to the recent crime reduction has been small. If we estimate the drop
for serious crime at about 35% between 1993 and 2001, the research
consensus is that about one-fifth of that crime reduction can be
34
explained by the increase in the incarceration rate for that period.
Western joins but amends this consensus, again by an imaginative
reference to juveniles. If we look to the whole period from 1980 to 2000,
while adult imprisonment jumped 430%, juvenile incarceration jumped
35
only about 50%. Yet we have seen a drop in juvenile crime parallel to
36
the adult drop. Western concludes that absent formal changes in legal
rules that would restrict juvenile prosecutions—and, if anything, the
trend has been to lower the age for juveniles to be tried as adults—we
37
should have seen a rise of juveniles in incarceration.
So perhaps the continuing incarceration boom has to be traced to
deliberate policies or new practices, such as a dramatic shift toward
incarceration rather than probation sentences for certain crimes; an
increase in the length of prison sentences, driven both by formal
legislation (including habitual-offender and mandatory-minimum laws);
and a “dramatic increase in the prosecution and incarceration of drug
38
offenders.” Western does not say that lawmakers premeditated the
39
These changes “did not require any
increase in imprisonment.
33. See RYAN S. KING ET AL., INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX
RELATIONSHIP 6 (2005). Nevertheless, as discussed below, returns on incarceration
ultimately diminish because after concentrating on the highest-rate offenders, the system will
start incarcerating less potentially prolific ones. Furthermore, in the area of drug crimes, the
key determinant of the crime rate may be the number of opportunities rather than the supply
of malefactors. Id.
34. See id. at 4; ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 55; Rucker Johnson & Stephen Raphael, How
Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 2), available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_
crimeincarcJLE.pdf.
35. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 39–40.
36. Id. at 41 tbl.2.1 (noting declines in criminal activity among youths from 1980 to
2000).
37. Id. at 39–40 (arguing that because juvenile incarceration has only risen modestly,
“[i]f we observe large declines in juvenile crime, as we have for adults, it is much less likely
that these are explained by rising incarceration”).
38. Id. at 50.
39. See id. at 105. Western stresses that there are other discretionary stages along the
way to prison at which greater punitiveness can occur. He notes that even where reports of
crimes to the police declined, a higher percentage of arrests led to imprisonment. Id. at 43–
44.
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conspiracy on the part of policy makers.”40 Rather, they were rooted in
a variety of functional and expressive motivations that ultimately reflect
either a willingness to tolerate or indifference to an increase in prison
populations and the effects thereof.
As a corollary, note another important causal factor that needs
consideration as one reviews Western’s picture of American
incarceration: the inertia of the incarceration rate itself. The United
States has actually proved capable of reducing its incarceration rate—it
did so at least slightly in the 1970s, just before the major increase
41
began. Even more remarkably, as he was becoming the leader of
modern conservatism, then-Governor Ronald Reagan effected an
amazing 34% decrease in California’s prison population, largely through
more use of probation, more generous parole release, and far fewer
42
parole revocations. Moreover, in the last few years budget crises and
moral doubts over mandatory drug laws have led some states to declare
truces on the political demagoguery over crime-related issues so that
43
they could reduce their prison populations. But the conventional view
is that mass incarceration is here to stay indefinitely, for two primary
reasons: First, as recent analyses of mass incarceration have shown, once
incarceration reaches a critical mass, it is self-reinforcing by virtue of the
criminogenic nature of the prison experience and the resilience of
American criminal justice institutions in reabsorbing and recycling
44
Second, even though drastic
recidivists (so-called “net-widening”).
percentage reductions like the one under then-Governor Reagan in
In an important new paper, John Pfaff examines previously unused data to explain the
sharp increase in imprisonment and concludes that the key cause lay with prosecutors in
increasing felony filings per arrest, rather than increased arrests by police or longer sentences
imposed by legislatures or judges. John Pfaff, The Centrality of Prosecutors to Prison Growth:
An Empirical Assessment (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1884674.
40. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 105.
41. See Rosemary Gartner et al., The Past as Prologue? Decarceration in California
Then and Now, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 291, 293 (2011).
42. Id. at 291, 292, 299.
43. See Marc Mauer, State Sentencing Reforms: Is the “Get Tough” Era Coming to a
Close?, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 50, 51–52 (2002); Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing
Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 201 (2007).
44. On how parole revocation has become the new major source of prison admissions in
California, see JOAN PETERSILIA, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 73–74
(2006). On the complexity and arbitrariness of factors that determine parole revocation and
thereby confound any meaningful notion of recidivism, see James A. Wilson, Bad Behavior or
Bad Policy? An Examination of Tennessee Release Cohorts, 1993–2001, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 485 (2005); and Sheila Royo Maxwell, Essay, Rethinking the Broad Sweep of
Recidivism: A Task for Evaluators, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 519, 519–20 (2005).
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California have really happened, the absolute numbers imprisoned now
are so large that an equivalent percentage decrease has become
45
politically infeasible.
But if specific governmental policies were the immediate causes of
the prison boom, what caused them to become our policies? The
standard political story combines white populist backlash with the civil
rights movement, the capture of the white South by the Republicans,
Nixon’s translation of working class resentment into law-and-order
propaganda, and general disenchantment with the welfare programs
46
established under Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson. But
what of deeper structural and economic causes? In their famous 1939
account, Rusche and Kirchheimer surveyed European history from the
Middle Ages on and inferred that imprisonment is the way a capitalist
47
society deals with surplus labor in times of economic difficulty.
Imprisonment goes up to curb social threats of the idle poor, and down
when those idle poor can be deployed in private production;
imprisonment can also go up if prison labor can be productive, except if
the unimprisoned poor then rebel against the competition—“‘if the
prison does not underbid the slum in human misery, the slum will empty
48
and the prison will fill.’”
While tempting to materially focused liberal theorists, the Rusche–
Kirchheimer thesis is susceptible to charges of underestimating moral
and political upheavals (such as “moral panic” and eruptions of
49
fascism ), or the effects of a shift to a modern service economy, or the
differential economic effects of the varieties of sanctions (such as
probation, which does not necessarily interfere with employment at
50
all). Worse yet, modern statistical studies, while somewhat confirming
the short-term positive correlation of unemployment and imprisonment,

45. Gartner et al., supra note 42, at 314.
46. See id.; Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1246 (2005).
47. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
50–51 (1939). This book was based on the famous earlier article by Georg Rusche,
Abreitsmarkt und Strafvollzug, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG 63 (1933) (Ger.),
reprinted in 10 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 2 (Gerda Dinwiddie trans., 1978).
48. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting WEBB & SHAW, ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, at xi (1922)).
49. Theodore G. Chiricos & Miriam A. Delone, Labor Surplus and Punishment: A
Review and Assessment of Theory and Evidence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 421, 425–26 (1992).
50. See Ivan Jankovic, Labor Market and Imprisonment, CRIME & SOC. JUST., Fall–
Winter 1977, at 17, 18 (1977).
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cast considerable doubt on an inverse relationship with lagging
unemployment rates.
The legatees of Rusche–Kirchheimer include David Garland, who
describes a brutal dialectic whereby the white middle class—
overwhelmed by media depictions of increases in crime and related
social disorders of drugs, sexual immorality, and political protests,
fearing the opening of the labor force to women and minorities—is
coopted by the low-tax, low-regulation Reagan–Thatcher neoliberalism
into rejecting spending on social improvement and security and thus
51
promoting harsh penalty as the sole worthy government program.
Jonathan Simon adds to this theme that government learned—and
taught private citizens and institutions—to deploy both the apparatus
and public imagery of criminal law (i.e., “governing-through-crime”) to
address anxiety about social disorder in school, the workplace, the
52
housing project, even the suburban “community.” But these theories,
speaking ominously of the deep, broad tropisms of late modernity, are
often unclear about the strength and specific mechanisms of their
favored determinants and risk devolving into that default, often
tautological, category of “culture.”
As a corollary, comparativists pondering the anomaly of American
incarceration have explored how differing such forms of modern social
53
organization link to incarceration rates. Neoliberal societies (e.g., the
United States) have relatively weak labor unions, reject the pursuit of
Japanese-style “industrial policies” linking public and private business
54
planning, and offer relatively thin welfare programs. “Corporatist”
societies (e.g., Sweden) are more “organized” in the sense of
establishing by custom, if not rule, close relationships among unions,
government, social service nonprofits, official agencies, and trade
groups. They are more generous in welfare, more regulated, and more
55
committed to nurturing institutions of “so-called civil society.” For
John Sutton, incarceration rates correlate with the placement of a
56
country along the spectrum from neoliberal to corporatist. Extending
Sutton in her recent book, The Prisoners’ Dilemma, Nicola Lacey
51. See GARLAND, supra note 13, at 85–87, 98–102 (2001).
52. See SIMON, supra note 14, at 3–13.
53. John R. Sutton, The Political Economy of Imprisonment in Affluent Western
Democracies, 1960–1990, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 170 (2004) (analyzing effects of business cycles,
political power, and the structure of labor market institutions stemming from differences
between neoliberal and corporatist societies).
54. See id. at 176.
55. Id. at 175–76.
56. Id. at 172, 184–85.
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observes that more coordinated market economies—such as Germany—
benefit from the discipline of coalition politics and proportional
representation systems; their bureaucracies are both less politicized and
less adversarial and so less vulnerable to the vagaries of demagoguery of
57
American politicking over crime.
Western reviews and partly credits these factors. He affirms that the
incarceration boom began as punitive legislation caused by conservative
58
backlash against civil rights. He also goes beyond the standard political
story to test the correlation to penal policy of such ground-level factors
as controlling political parties (the incarceration rate is 14% higher
under Republican governors), urbanization, and the quantity of (and
59
But Western’s special
budgetary investment in) police officers.
contribution concerns the relationship between imprisonment rates and
the decline of the lower-level labor market for minorities.
First, controlling for certain state-level fixed effects, he finds that for
the years 1980–2000, every 0.1% increase in a state’s population of
unemployed men under the age of forty-five who had completed high
school but not college, was associated with a 2.3% increase in the
60
incarceration rate. “By 2001, the prison admission rate for all men,
aged twenty to thirty-nine, would be 20[%] lower if the relative risk of
imprisonment had not increased so much among high school
61
dropouts.” Second, looking to income, Western finds that for all black
and white men combined, a $100 increase in weekly pay—roughly the
increment attributable to a high school degree—“is associated with a
62
32[%] decline in the chances of imprisonment.” Between the mid1980s and late 1990s, for blacks without a high school degree, a 7%
employment decline created an 11% imprisonment rise, and the $30per-hour pay decrease they suffered between the mid-1900s and late
63
1990s is linked to an 8% rise in prison admissions. Third, Western
57. NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 72–73 (2008). For an argument that
neoliberalism proves a powerful explanation for the form and scope of a nation’s criminal
justice system, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). For a critique that attacks the
concept of neoliberalism as too broad and vague to supply sufficiently determined casual
explanations, see James Q. Whitman, The Free Market and the Prison, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1212 (2012) (reviewing HARCOURT, supra).
58. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 59.
59. Id. at 69, 71–72.
60. Id. at 70.
61. Id. at 77.
62. Id. at 77–78.
63. Id. at 78.
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finds a very strong negative correlation between liberal social welfare
policy and the state incarceration rate, both across states and within
64
states over the last few decades.
In sum, the best causal theory is that the number of men—in
particular unschooled men—who will end up in prison increases as the
number of men out of the labor force increases and economic support
provided through welfare policies decreases.
Fourth, Western somewhat skeptically reviews the Rusche–
Kirchheimer thesis, observing that the unemployment rate as
conventionally measured fluctuates too much with macroeconomic
65
conditions to yield any clear correlations with incarceration. But he
adds the nice twist that official unemployment statistics are a poor
measure of joblessness because they exclude from the denominator the
66
With
people who are unemployed because they are incarcerated.
prisoners included, the jobless rates for young white (aged 22–30) males
in 2000 increases from 10.6% to 12.0%, and the portion of all jobless
who were incarcerated during the twenty years from 1980 to 2000, when
the inmate population of young white males went from 90,000 to
67
185,000, increases from one-twentieth to one-eighth. For “crime-age”
black men (aged 22–35) without a high school degree, the jobless rate
68
for 1980 jumps from 34% to 49%, and in 2000 from 41% to 65%. The
blunt inference from this reframing is that in 2000 a full two-thirds of the
young adult jobless blacks without a high school degree were in prison—
69
at the height of a major national economic expansion.
But perhaps Western wants to press the idea that the perception of
economic hopelessness inspires jobless individuals to commit crimes;
and, that potential offenders view the incarcerated jobless as
confirmation of their fears and hence further motivation to commit
crime in some long-run way that is not captured by directly matching
64. Id. at 66–73.
65. Id. at 67–68.
66. Id. at 94–95.
67. Id. at 89. More strikingly, for young male Hispanics, for whom the actual number of
incarcerated people jumped from 25,000 to 130,000 between 1980 and 2000, the jobless rate
jumps from 10.3% to 14.3% with the adjustment for those incarcerated, to the point that of
this new expanded jobless group, 30% were incarcerated. Id. at 89–90. And most strikingly
of all, for blacks, the jobless rate for young males in 1980 moves from 22.9% to 26.7% with
the adjustment, while after two decades, when the actual incarcerated population of young
black men rose from 110,000 to 285,000, the unadjusted jobless rate is 23.7% but the adjusted
rate is 32.4%, so that one-third of young black jobless men were in prison. Id. at 90.
68. Id. at 91.
69. Id.
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employment and crime rates. Perhaps the causal implication of this
adjustment is intended to be longer-term and even more tentative: That
is, in jurisdictions where people get recycled in and out of prison, the
difference between being jobless in and out of prison is ultimately
unimportant, and these two forms of joblessness are equally selfreinforcing in terms of perpetual joblessness and poverty, and work
together to produce future imprisonment. Western wants to underscore
the potentially reinforcing nature of joblessness by increasing the
number who will find it hard to get back into the labor pool and perhaps
to leave seeds of thought about how incarceration will always feedback
on itself.
Thus, Western may be willing to take advantage of whatever
resonances might arise in the minds of readers as to how a remeasured
jobless proportion of society helps explain the perpetuation of prison,
without directly focusing on the intermediation of a rise in the crime
rate. And indeed Punishment and Inequality is certainly open to the
criticism that it slips and slides among confident and more tentative
causal linkages as well as mere “associations” and correlations that
intrigue and disturb but have no necessary causal significance. At times
Western uses loose language about these correlations, such as saying
that “[c]lass inequality in imprisonment increased dramatically from
1983 to 2001, contributing about 20[%] to the rise in risk of prison
70
admission.” And sometimes his causal hints are stronger: “[Thus,] a
central implication of labor market theories of incarceration [is that]
economic inequality expands criminal punishment among the
71
disadvantaged by increasing inequality in incarceration.” He observes
that “[t]he rise in the risk of imprisonment among less-educated men
72
may be related to trends in their earnings and employment.” And he
attacks traditional research that “offered little suggestion that the prison
73
boom was fueled by the poor job prospects of less-skilled blacks.”
But consider this statement by Western, about recent American
history: “Missing, perhaps, some social supports of the European kind,
violence, disorder and idleness flourished in America’s ghettos, creating
for government not just an economic problem, but a problem of social
74
control.” If it vaguely smacks of the leftist social theory approaches of
Garland and Simon, Western may indeed be tempting us to consider
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 105.
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these left-social-theory treatments of modern imprisonment. Indeed, he
may even be partly resurrecting the Rusche–Kirchheimer thesis, even if
he is wary of committing to its empirical claims.
Regardless of whether Western intends some kind of homage to
Rusche–Kirchheimer, his real goals are surely moral, political, and
rhetorical. He wants us to be embarrassed by the economic context and
consequences of the imprisonment rate. He sums this up by saying that
the hidden great numbers of prison inmates “occupy a shadowy status
that affects a variety of official statistics that record the economic wellbeing of the population,” and that “[t]he prison boom makes a new
75
contribution to the invisibility of the poor.” A Marxist or a highly
instrumental promoter of the Rusche–Kirchheimer view might argue
that whatever forces might motivate the powerful to want to increase
economic inequality or render the poor invisible, prison is a way of
doing this, but Western’s story reads more like one of reckless
indifference. The incarcerated are invisible and therefore we do not
observe the powerful engine of future economic misery it operates.
Western eyes, in particular, the common misleading narrative of the
last decade of the twentieth century as a period of economic boom,
which greatly reduced the income gap between whites and blacks. But
as Western shows, just as the official figures distort the picture of
76
joblessness, they distort the wage distribution. From the mid-1980s to
the late 1990s, the wage gap (for hourly wages) between whites and
77
blacks went up slightly to a peak in 1985 and then dipped somewhat.
Further, even though a Democrat was President for most of the decade,
the somewhat Panglossian retelling of the 1990s includes the welfare
reforms credited with enhancing and demonstrating the power of a
limited government, laissez-faire economy that contrasted with the
weaker performance of European economies. To this, Western demurs:
“The government, rather than withdrawing from the lives of young
disadvantaged blacks, significantly increased its role. Lawmakers who,
in other contexts, would celebrate the value of limited government and
free markets, adopted policies that massively and coercively regulated

75. Id. at 87.
76. Id. at 97.
77. Id. at 98–99 & fig.4.5. Western acknowledges and allows for the fact that the people
headed into prison at any point those years were making 80% of the wages of those not
headed to prison. But even taking that into account, the effect of including the jailed
population indicates that the shrinkage in the wage gap was much less than the official
numbers. Id. at 100–02.
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the poor.”78 Western wants to fight the naïve or disingenuous
puzzlement some have expressed about how imprisonment could rise in
such a time of prosperity, a view that reinforces the tendency to
disentangle imprisonment from economic factors and also might induce
overestimation of the link between crime rates and imprisonment or of
the credit that prison deserves for the 1990s crime reduction. The
imagery of widespread economic success either leads Americans to
ignore the prison boom altogether, or to shrug at it as beyond any
explanation—as some odd disconnected fact that might trace to the
79
unfortunate, incurable presence of malevolent individuals. In fact, he
wants to challenge any national self-congratulation about the civil rights
movement because invisible mass incarceration is a form of residential
segregation, so that by virtue of imprisonment, “the invisibility of
today’s poor remains rooted in the physical and social distance between
80
whites and blacks.”
One more causal explanation emanating from social theory is worth
mentioning: Americans’ belief in our own uniqueness or, to use the
recurring cliché, exceptionalism. “The notion of American uniqueness
or exceptionalism is traditionally traced to Puritan conceptions of a new
world, created out of virgin territory and charged with special spiritual
81
and political destiny.” This exceptionalist thinking has shaped many
fields of inquiry and social practices, including crime. For many decades
now, a settled notion among both Americans and Europeans has been
that the United States has an anomalously high rate of violent—and
82
While it is difficult to establish actual
especially lethal—crime.
American crime rates before roughly the 1930s, it is even more difficult
78. Id. at 105.
79. At the risk of sentimentality, Western would like us to recur a bit to the Great
Depression, when there was relative solidarity in economic misery, and when we were more
open to believing in structural explanations for social misery. See id. at 86–87. He therefore
also wants us to recur to the spirit of Harrington’s 1962 The Other America and its moral
achievement in embarrassing the United States into taking poverty seriously. Id. at 85–86.
80. Id. at 86.
81. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 9.
This destiny evolves from a religious self-conception into a secular one. Along the
way, our exceptional sense of self can become a very brutal thing leading us to
assimilate or eliminate native peoples in the name of destiny though, as some have
observed, our special American sense of self allows us to accept or justify violence
by a claim that in our secular theology violence can and must have a high moral
purpose to be redeemed.
Id.
82. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 3.
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to trust figures from other nations; this perception is likely accurate—at
83
least for violent crime. There are a number of sociological and cultural
explanations for America’s crime exceptionalism, including the power of
the frontier and individualism in our mythic self-conception, as well as
history and consequences of slavery and, to a lesser extent, late84
nineteenth-century immigration.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCARCERATION BOOM
Much of the commentary on mass incarceration alludes to the costs
associated with harm to families and neighborhoods—costs that are real
but impossible to measure well. Western aims at a more measurable
harm—the direct effect of imprisonment on prisoners’ future
employment and income.
Controlling for the pre-imprisonment personal factors that would
themselves reduce job and money prospects, Western isolates the
“Aggregate Earnings Penalty” (AEP)—the decrease in future earnings
85
attributable solely to past incarceration. Western infers that a postprison offender will suffer a 30%–40% reduction in annual income, and
if released in his early twenties, he will enjoy no real wage growth
86
In absolute numbers,
whatsoever between the ages of 25 and 35.
imprisonment will, on average, cost him around $100,000 over his
lifetime (ironically, the amount is highest for whites, because their base
87
These findings resonate with those of
pay is higher on average).
sociologist Devah Pager, who staged employment interviews by sending
in pairs of testers objectively identical except for the former
incarceration status of one, with a sufficient racial mix to isolate racial
88
Pager concluded that (wholly apart from all the
discrimination.
individual factors that would have predicted inmate status) incarceration
83. Id. at 7.
84. See Weisberg, supra note 3, at 21, 29, 43. Of course the problem now is that
American crime rates have increasingly converged with those in Europe, so that the focus on
crime exceptionalism has to be more on homicide than crime generally, and even there the
gap is narrowing. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 51. But however thematically crime
and imprisonment are related, whatever the cultural relation there is between being brutal to
each other and our government being brutal to us, the problem is not the crime anomaly but
the prison anomaly, and for that issue the standard exceptionalism theories, themes, and
explanations offer less help.
85. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 125–26.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION, at viii (2007).
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of white applicants reduced the “callback” percentage from 34% to
89
17%; for blacks, from 14% to 5%. Western also found that the AEP
was at least related to other bad social outcomes post-prison: increased
domestic violence, increased rupture of existing marital or other
domestic partnership arrangements (in part because of increased
90
domestic violence), and possibly reduced future marriageability as well.
The disconnected, erratic personal lives of ex-prisoners makes them
much more likely to recidivate and—depending on parole revocation
rules—more likely to reenter prison cyclically.
In short, mass
incarceration has itself produced a new and massive underclass,
91
disproportionately made up of racial minorities.
Given the picture that emerges from the work of Western and
others, it does not seem hyperbolic to suggest the United States has lost
the moral authority to impose retributive punishment and lacks the
intellectual and political authority to claim any cost–benefit rationality
in carrying out any welfare-enhancing goals of incarceration. At the
very least, it suggests that punishment theorists have a moral obligation
to reconsider theoretical commitments in light of the grim social reality
that punishment itself has helped bring about.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT RECONSIDERED
According to a stock story, a revival of retributivism,92 in a mutually
reinforcing relationship with a legislative movement toward more rigid
93
and harsher sentences, has driven the last two decades of punishment
89. Id. at 90–91 & fig.5.1.
90. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 131–63.
91. For the argument that mass incarceration has created a demimonde of people not so
much comprising a distinct status but rather as lacking in any political or social status, see
Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S
NEW DEATH PENALTY 96, 97–99 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., forthcoming
2012) (citing theorist Giorgio Agamben for the notion of a “bare life,” GIORGIO AGAMBEN,
HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 12 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans.,
1998)).
92. Russell Christopher collects some of the proclamatory verbiage, including “rise,”
“resurgence,” and “renaissance,” and also helpfully reviews some of the key scholarship in
this revival as well as some of the commonly cited explanations for it. Christopher, supra
note 4, at 845–46 & nn.2–5. While public discourse about punishment often relies on the
rhetoric of retributivism, much of the new sentencing legislation is probably better explained
by an angry devotion to incapacitation, especially in terms of “three strikes” and other
habitual offender laws. Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17,
36, 39 (2004). The blurring of the two is also discussed below in regard to Zimring and
Hawkins’ book on incapacitation, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE
RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995). See infra Part V.A.4.a.
93. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U.
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jurisprudence. The story focuses on the mid-century failures of
discretionary sentencing against the once-strong, science-grounded
promise of rehabilitation. Promoters spanned the political spectrum,
with different but converging motives: conservatives denounced
rehabilitation for excessive leniency and for naïve sentimentality
regarding the malleability of the individual; civil libertarians denounced
it for authorizing excessive sentences capriciously disparate while
94
unrelated to moral desert. In the 1960s, the new retributivism started.
The reversal was so complete that prominent academics like Albert
Alschuler expressed self-critical disbelief that they could ever have
fallen for so bizarre a notion as indeterminate sentencing rooted in
95
utilitarian theories.
Tonry’s introduction to Why Punish? How Much? is a wise
commentary on the “fashions” of punishment theory, and it amends the
96
stock story. Tonry cautions that fashions change, and that even short97
Thus, to say that
term phases of change are often equivocal.
retributivism dominates criminal justice today would be an
overstatement. A more accurate characterization might be that we are
in an uncertain period in which one major factor has been a strand of
retributivism that incorporates mitigation in the gentle utilitarianism of
98
restorative and therapeutic justice.
For Tonry, the American system of criminal justice—with its prisons,
parole boards, juvenile courts, and probation officers—is a mid- to latenineteenth century construct driven by unabashedly utilitarian
99
motivations. Tonry’s creation story describes an era when academic
commentary greatly influenced policy toward indeterminate sentencing
as an instrument for tailoring salutary moral education to the needs of
100
individual miscreants. Indeed, officials and scholars of that era prided
CIN. L. REV. 749, 784 (2006).
94. Weisberg, supra note 43, at 183–84.
95. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 552
(1978).
96. Tonry, Introduction, supra note 5, at 3, 7.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Id. at 23–24.
99. Id. at 3.
100. See id. at 14–15. “Indeterminate” and “determinate” sentencing are ambiguous
terms. That is, Americans sentencing at mid-century had generally taken the form of broad
ranges from which a trial judge could select a sentence followed by discretionary parole, so
the judge’s decision was unstructured and the ultimate length of time served was
undetermined at time of sentencing. The modern turn to determinacy surely reflects new
punitive attitudes in the United States, but as one leading commentator, Kevin Reitz, has
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themselves that a high rate of incarceration signaled commitment to
101
reforming the misguided.
Late-Victorian utilitarianism remained dominant well into the
twentieth century. Consider the 1950s’ original Model Penal Code
(MPC): Although the part of the MPC that law students know best is its
culpability taxonomy of mental states reflecting moral desert, MPC
godfathers Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler dismissed retributive
justice as nonsense. Michael and Wechsler proclaimed that the legal art
and science of rehabilitative and indeterminate sentencing stands
102
unopposed as the spirit of modern criminal law. They found allies in
such academic endeavors as criminologist Sheldon Glueck’s idea for
actual sentencing power to be vested in a “Socio-Penal Commission”
103
consisting of neutral medical and academic experts.
Tonry collects classics from Bentham, Kant, and Hegel with modern
contributions from retributivists Andrew von Hirsch and Norval Morris,
social theories of Foucault and Loci Wacquant rooted in Marxism, and
defenses of restorative and therapeutic justice. But the recent theorists
worry most about how to maintain their own coherence and
differentiation; their feints against fact-based challenges are chiefly
rhetorical flourishes or abstract gestures meant to appeal to
intellectualism. But with Tonry’s admonitions in mind, the real story of
modern punishment jurisprudence is not just the rise of any one school
but an insularity whereby theorists worry mostly about their own
internal coherence or about their conceptual differentiation from others’
theories; theorists’ feints in the direction of fact-based challenges to
their theories are chiefly rhetorical or abstract gestures meant to shore
up claims of internal coherence. Moreover, their attempts to proffer
justifying or even explanatory theories of punishment prove orthogonal
to the key social, political, and economic questions about mass
incarceration and deserve major emphasis. Retributivism is the best
example.

pointed out, highly structured sentencing by itself is neutral as to punitiveness in terms of a
bias away from probation toward prison or the length of sentences. Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t
Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1787, 1798–99 & fig.3 (2006).
101. Tonry, Introduction, supra note 5, at 11–12.
102. See id. at 4, 16–18.
103. Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 476
(1928), reprinted in SHELDON GLUECK, CRIME AND CORRECTION: SELECTED PAPERS 72, 95
(1952).
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A. Retribution and Retributivism
It is too categorical to say that retributivists have ignored the real
world of imprisonment.
They have, if anything, struggled to
accommodate worldly realities, but have done so in insular, abstract,
and incomplete ways that smack more of concern for intellectual nuance
and rigor than moral accountability for the social effects of a
retributivist system. They have failed to acknowledge, much less meet,
the challenge that the mass-incarceration books declare—a challenge
that requires a much deeper rethinking of what role jurisprudence
should play and has played.
1. Flavors of Contemporary Retributivism
The recent voices of retributivism have been markedly varied.
There are the avowed political conservatives like Ernest van den Haag,
who almost vindictively denounces rehabilitation as feckless, invoking
(or purporting to invoke) pure deontological concerns as a moral
104
There have been
catharsis for a misguided liberal moral relativism.
the strong but more nuanced and nonpolemical voices of retributivism
such as Michael Moore, who has worked to reconcile retributivism with
the principle known as moral realism by tying the supposed
deontological notion of moral desert with a kind of naturalist human
105
There have been liberal versions of retributivism that
psychology.
embrace it as an antidote to modern instrumental economic thinking.
These include Dan Markel (whose “Confrontational Conception of
Retribution” promotes retributivism in service to his professed political
ideals of “moral accountability for unlawful actions; . . . equal liberty
106
under law; and . . . democratic self-defense”) and Antony Duff (whose
liberal communitarian version of retributivism aims to induce
107
Also prominent among these liberal
repentance and reconciliation).

104. Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957,
967–72 (1985). Consider this example: “Human beings are human because they can be held
responsible, as animals cannot be. In that Kantian sense the death penalty is a symbolic
affirmation of the humanity of both victim and murderer.” Id. at 972.
105. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1997). For an argument that Moore struggles unsuccessfully to reconcile his
strong view of retributivism with the deterministic implications of naturalism, see Thomas W.
Clark, Against Retribution, 3 HUM. NATURE REV. 466 (2003) (reviewing MOORE, supra).
106. Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 426–27
(2005).
107. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY, at xviii (2001).
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and nonpolemical retributivists are those like Herbert Morris,108 who
offer notions of retribution tied to somewhat Rawlsian notions of
109
fairness; others offer contractarian theories of government, or, like
Joel Feinberg, argue that retributivism serves a function of reinforcing
110
the moral solidarity of society.
In all its forms, the revival of retributivism has entailed a
recommitment to deontological values that put individual responsibility
at the moral center of criminal law. But a consistent problem with those
purporting to invoke deontological retributivism is that they often lack
the courage of full deontology, and, as I will suggest below, the current
state of retributivist scholarship is all about the degree of
consequentialism that retributivism should incorporate. One of the
central figures of retributivism, Michael Moore, strongly declares that
111
we have a duty to punish according to retributivist principles, and yet
he regularly issues key qualifiers to the notion that desert is a sufficient
condition for punishment:
Within the set of conditions constituting intelligible reasons to
punish, the retributivist asserts, desert is sufficient, i.e., no other
of these conditions is necessary. Of course other conditions
outside the set of conditions constituting intelligible reasons to
punish may also be necessary to a just punishment, such as the
condition that the punishment not violate any non-forfeited
112
rights of an offender.
Thus, Moore has been described as a “threshold deontologist,” i.e.,
he would allow the deontic duty to punish to yield to some variance
108. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 32 (1976).
109. See MICHAEL DAVIS, TO MAKE THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7–9 (1992).
110. JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 98–105 (1970). An interesting theme in retributivism that has produced
some very thoughtful commentary recently is the issue of “subjectivism.” This concept
considers whether adjusting punishments to the likely degree or pain that a particular
individual or type of person will experience is a fairer way of ensuring desert than an
objective approach. For a fine treatment, see Adam J. Kolber, Essay, The Subjective
Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009). I would immunize this work
from the charge of ignoring mass incarceration because it honestly operates at a rarefied level
of moral philosophy.
111. MOORE, supra note 105, at 91 (asserting that moral desert is both a necessary and
sufficient basis for punishment).
112. Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted).
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based on the moral gravity of the offense or the magnitude of
113
In a somewhat different vein is the highly
countervailing factors.
influential retributivist Andrew von Hirsch. Usually a harsh polemicist
committed to debunking what he considers the laughable flaws of
utilitarian rationales for punishment, von Hirsch sometimes adopts a
defensive tone in arguing for ease of administration as a key
114
Indeed, von Hirsch reveals an
comparative virtue of retributivism.
intellectual anxiety common to even strong retributivists by avoiding
115
references to “retribution” in favor of “desert.”
In this regard, von Hirsch somewhat aligns with Paul Robinson and
John Darley, who acknowledge the impossibility of retributivism as a
purely desert-focused basis for determining the proper punishment for
an act but insist that common moral intuition at least supplies a reliable
metric for the ordinal measurement of punishment. Moreover, they
argue that obeying consensus moral instincts has the great instrumental
value of encouraging respect for the criminal law—something the
authors somewhat awkwardly tie to a refined version of general
116
deterrence.
113. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
815, 850 & n.96 (2007).
114. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976). Von Hirsch concedes that sometimes retribution leads to shorter
sentences than were frequent in the 1970s, but he insists that the solution to equating
punishment and desert and to economizing on prison costs is a literal and public inflection of
pain. Thus, he argues that pain is a necessary condition of justice and denies such liberal
shibboleths as the idea that the prisoner has right of integrity over his own body. See id.; see
also GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: A CASE FOR CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF
CRIMINALS 19, 33 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining von Hirsch’s arguments and the “confusion about
the use of pain in criminal punishment”).
115. VON HIRSCH, supra note 114, at 45–46.
116. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
457 (1997). Robinson and Darley state:
In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the only society-wide
mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences. . . .
. . . If it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community,
given sufficient information and time to reflect, would perceive as condemnable,
people are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as
appropriate to follow in those borderline cases in which the propriety of certain
conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor.
Id.; see also John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment,
24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (finding that sentencing intuitions of the public
focus on just deserts). Robinson has suggested that there are actually three major types of
retributivism, or “desert.” In addition to “empirical desert” there is “vengeful desert,” which
aligns punishment with the amount of harm the offender causes, and “deontological desert,”
where punishment is determined by the absolute degree of the moral wrongfulness of the
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If von Hirsch’s threshold model suggests a somewhat ambivalent
commitment to retributivism, the Robinson–Darley approach raises
more serious problems. At first glance it is an effort to salvage
retributivism from charges of hyper-abstraction by rooting moral views
in popular consensus, or, more modestly, a search for some reliable
benchmark for otherwise elusive deontological judgments. But their
work exemplifies how retributivism purports to accommodate or
confront social reality while mostly appropriating a small part of that
reality for purposes of internal rationalization. And in that regard, note
its strange acknowledgment of endogeneity. Criminal law will be more
efficacious if the populace finds its moral views reflected in the penal
system. But the endogeneity runs deeper than they acknowledge, since
their approach invites democratic populism to endorse any current
system as retributively just and thereby promote its continual selfreinforcement.
Perhaps the most important contemporary example of ambivalent
retributivism is the so-called “limiting retributivism” associated with
117
Norval Morris and which has also been called “hybrid retributivism.”
This concept is often traced to H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between
retributivism as a general justification for punishment and retributivism
118
as method of distributing punishment, with the acceptance of the
former and rejection of the latter. Hence retributivism becomes a
necessary but insufficient condition for punishment of individuals, and
an eclectic reliance on consequences of punishment can help determine
the right sanction under the maximum permitted by the retributivist
measure. This limiting retributivism has become what might be
described as the politically correct version of retributivism, the liberal
119
shibboleth relied on by the new Model Penal Code of Sentencing. In
his rationale for the new MPC, reporter Kevin Reitz laments the failures
of incapacitation and rehabilitation and declares the need to
accommodate retribution, because in recent years even
retributive theory has advanced far in both application and
acceptance. Reflection suggests that moral bases for punishment
offense.
Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 146–50 (2008).
117. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
118. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 9 (1968).
119. Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for
Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 528 (2002) (invoking Norval Morris’s idea of
retributivism supplying upper and lower limits for a particular crime).
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will be present in any punishment system administered by
human beings, and such impulses can hardly be eradicated
through legislation. Indeed, some theorists posit that retribution
is an affirmative, morally-required foundation for criminal
120
sanctions.
As Reitz lays it out, one of limiting retributivism’s chief benefits is
that it suggests a proportional ordering of severity; within the
retributivist range, “utilitarian goals such as rehabilitation and
121
incapacitation may be given rein to operate.” Reitz’s language seems
to emphasize the retributivist rationale and treat consequentialist
concerns as subordinate qualifiers. But in concept, if threshold
retributivism presumptively relies on desert (but qualifies it to account
for certain consequences), the MPC’s retributivism points in an almost
122
opposite direction.
2. The Standard Criticisms
The resurgence of retributivism in legal academy has (not
surprisingly) provoked spirited challenges to its premises and
implications. These challenges are powerful, and yet, with barely any
123
exceptions, even when they attack retributivism for disconnection
from social reality they acquiesce in a narrow view of that social reality
so as to ignore mass incarceration.
Of the traditional attacks on retributivism, some have argued that
retributivists are fatally ambiguous or evasive about what exactly
retributivism purports to be and to do: whether it is a strictly moral
concept or a designedly legal concept; whether it is mandatory or
permissive; whether it is meant to guide the level of punishment inflicted
or just provide a foundational moral justification for the very existence
of the practice of punishment; and whether it justifies limits on an
otherwise utilitarian deployment of punishment or instead is just a oneway ratchet to justify harsher penalties than society might choose on
124
utilitarian or other grounds. Others have focused on why it is logically
120. Id. at 555–56 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 556.
122. See Cahill, supra note 113, at 836 (arguing that retributivism should be the
justification for punishment, constrained by utilitarian limits, whereas the Model Penal Code
looks to retributivism as a limit on consequentialist goals).
123. But see infra notes 171–174 (discussing Edward Rubin’s views on limiting
retributivism).
124. See Christopher, supra note 4, at 865–67.
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impossible to achieve because of two major social facts: the scarcity of
governmental resources and the fallibility of human judgment.
The modern classic of criticism in this genre is David Dolinko’s
125
Dolinko begins by laying out the
Three Mistakes of Retributivism.
retributivists’ claim to moral advantage over proponents of instrumental
punishment theories: that retributivism gives offenders exactly the
punishment they “deserve” for their wrongful deeds, and hence never
“uses” them, in a Kantian sense, by punishing them more than they
126
deserve in order to serve some other social end. That claim, Dolinko
argues, rests on three fundamental errors. The first is the failure to see
that retributivism itself “uses” individuals in precisely the same way,
when it deploys concrete systems of punishment knowing that they are
fallible, and therefore knowingly accepting the occasional punishment of
127
the innocent in order to ensure that the guilty get what they deserve.
The second is the belief that we can come up with some objective
measure of “just deserts” that allows us to match the punishment
128
perfectly to the crime. As Dolinko shows, the purportedly objective
scales of “desert” that retributivists have come up with are wholly
circular or dependent on positive criminal law policy that itself cannot
129
The third is the belief that in
meet the test of perfect objectivity.
giving individuals the punishment they “deserve,” we are expressing
130
To put it differently, we
respect for them in a Kantian sense.
disrespect persons when we take into account various mitigating factors
in setting the level of punishment or seek to advance rehabilitative
goals, because we thereby assume that the criminal is not a fully
131
autonomous individual responsible for his own choices and actions.
To be sure, there are some defenses of retributivism that might seem
to finesse these question altogether. One is to say that retributivism is
inherently conceived solely to determine the proper sanction for
132
But that
individuals, not for wholesale classes of offenders.
definitional defense seems more descriptive than normative, and hence
fecklessly evasive. A related defense is to ascribe deontic duties to
125. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 (1992).
126. Id. at 1624–25, 1627, 1630.
127. Id. at 1632.
128. Id. at 1635–36.
129. See id. at 1637–38; see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 118, at 233.
130. See Dolinko, supra note 125, at 1642.
131. Id. at 1642–43.
132. See Cahill, supra note 113, at 819 & n.13 (summarizing views that the standard
method of most retributivists is to rely on contrived hypotheticals to test their rationales).
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different stages of a system. Thus, Michael Moore himself posits that we
can define deontic duty as only governing intentional actions in regard
to punishment, and not be responsible for unintentional, even
133
Thus, a government system can justify its
foreseeable, outcomes.
criminal justice system on a general deontic basis; it can also expect
system actors making individual and situational decisions (police or
judges) to follow deontic duty; but it can immunize from deontic duty
the designers of institutional subsystems because they have to take
134
account of resource constraints. But these efforts by retributivists to
find a harmonious relationship with consequentialism, at least when
done at this level of abstraction, have provoked one wise critic, Mitchell
Berman, to suggest that retributivists in effect “get over it” by accepting
135
the pointlessness of any distinction in the first place. Berman instead
suggests a modest but more workable distinction among degrees and
136
forms of retributivist acquiescence in instrumentalism.
3. Retributivism and the Economists
Much of the recent criticism, and self-criticism, of the retributivist
revival has involved discussion of whether retributivism can find any
possible harmony with the law-and-economics movement—a movement
inclined to stress deterrence as the logical purpose of the criminal
sanction. Richard Posner and other law-and-economics scholars have
generally dismissed retributivism in derogatory terms, as if those with a

133. Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1523, 1552 & n.79 (2007).
134. Id. “Choice sets” of institutional designers who must allocate scarce resources fall
outside the scope of deontic obligations. Id.
135. See Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433, 434 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
Berman argues that almost any supposedly deontic value can be recharacterized in terms of
its instrumental value. Id. at 442 & n.24. Berman focuses on Moore’s and others’ promotion
of retributivism or desert as “an intrinsic good” and then notes that they could not possibly
believe that deontological value is the only intrinsic good, else the overall virtue of any state
of affairs would equal the amount of punishment of guilt that occurs, regardless of other
social virtues. Id. at 439.
136. Berman concludes as follows:
The worry, then, is not that the divide between ‘retributivist instrumentalism’ and
‘non-retributivist instrumentalism’ is false, but that it is arbitrary. If we were
disposed to draw a binary classification within instrumentalist theories of
punishment, we could just as well do it between welfarist and non-welfarist
instrumentalism or deontological and non-deontological instrumentalism.
Id. at 443.
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utilitarian approach to the world find it an alien life-form.137 Although
he has, perhaps begrudgingly, considered the idea of the taste for
138
retribution as a revealed preference that can be factored into utility,
Posner has mostly argued that any concern for moral desert produces
results sharply at odds with rational efforts to reduce crime—sometimes
139
over-punishing and sometimes underpunishing.
Now a new strand of law-and-economics has considered the
possibility that retributivism can win harmony with the constraining
force of social fact. I will briefly review some of the variations within
this movement. But to telegraph my punch on this development: the
key factor this approach looks to is indeed constraint—but it is a
misapprehended or even fictitious notion of constraint—the supposed
constraint of limited resources in our political economy to punish in
proportion to the degree of deserved punishment. This constraint has a
corollary in the new law-and-economics approach to retribution—the
institutional imperfections and agency costs in the systems of
investigation
and
adjudication
might
also
contribute
to
underpunishment. And I argue that if we accept Bruce Western’s and
others’ findings about mass incarceration, these allusions to social fact
have become tragically beside the point.
We can start with the most optimistic, even Panglossian, approach—
140
that of Donald Wittman. Wittman implicitly calls on retributivists to
realize that they cannot have all that they want, but he still argues that
they can adjust to the real world by sensibly optimizing in the face of
these limitations. The premise is simply that retribution is a good thing
and thus can be optimized like any other good thing, so that limitations
on its availability are no more of a sacrifice than is true of any other
137. Posner addressed retributivism in a 1980 article, characterizing it as immoral and
irrational, or at least as primitive and nonrational. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and
Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 80–81 (1980). He does endorse its
social function in primitive and early societies, in which it may temper the desire of private
acts of vengeance, but dismisses its usefulness in modern societies, in which the function of
law enforcement is assumed by the state. Id. at 75–76. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, in
their treatise promoting a purely welfarist purpose for legal decision-making, condemn
retributivism as fundamentally unfair. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 3, 9 (2002).
138. Some legal economists have been more willing than Posner to accept a taste for
retribution as a significant and independent factor in the utilitarian calculus. See Alvin K.
Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
905, 919 (1985).
139. See Posner, supra note 137, at 82 (describing a system of punishment based on
retaliation and vengeance).
140. Donald Wittman, Punishment as Retribution, in 4 THEORY & DECISION 209 (1974).
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social good. Wittman takes retributivism as calling for punishment as
close to the fully deserved sanction-per-bad-act as possible, so that full
141
But generally recognizing the limited
punishment is “optimal.”
resources and imperfections of the criminal justice system, including
erroneous judgments and agency costs among institutional actors, he
assumes that there is an exogenously determined fitting punishment for
each crime, so that punishing all offenders at this level maximizes
142
justice.
Consider the terms in which this bridging effort is attempted:
Wittman is explicitly indifferent to the means by which the degree of
143
punishment that meets retributive standards is determined. He then
establishes a utility function whereby justice declines as punishment
exceeds or falls short of this level, and his model analyzes the
comparative degrees of injustice traceable to these deviations, whether
over or underpunishing, or failing to punish all criminals, or punishing
144
In effect, he writes a guide for how the rational
the innocent.
retributivist should act. At the most general level, if punishment is just,
145
then the more individuals that are punished the less justice there is.
But over or underpunishment for the relevant crime in terms of severity
and degrees of failure to punish the guilty all affect our efforts to
maximize justice. Thus, if a punishment is egregiously severe, then there
146
is more justice when fewer are punished. He accepts the “slack” of the
system because of the inefficiencies caused by multiple agents in the
147
In
process, and it increases as actual punishment goes down.
summary, if punishment is too big, as it increases it lowers the optimal

141. Id. at 211–12.
142. Id. at 215.
143. Id. at 211.
144. Id. at 210–26.
145. Id. at 218.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 215–16. In more detail, “[i]f the punishment is less than the optimal . . . , the
smaller the punishment the less the difference in justice between punishing many and a few of
[the guilty].” Id. at 215. But, “[i]f punishment is less than . . . [optimal], then the more . . .
punished, the greater the justice.” Id. at 216. “If the punishment is greater than [deserved],
the greater the punishment, the greater the justice of punishing a few of the known criminals
minus the justice of punishing many of them.” Id. at 218. So “as punishment increases [above
optimal], the optimal number of criminals not punished increases.” Id. Wittman even cites
some empirical evidence: When Virginia arguably overpunished drunk driving with a
mandatory loss of license, the result was jury nullification. Id. By contrast, he predicts that in
states that reduce marijuana possession from a felony to a misdemeanor, thereby adjusting
the punishment to what is perceived as deserved, the conviction rate will go up. Id.
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number of those punished, and when fewer of the known criminals are
148
punished, the less the optimal punishment.
While most retributivists (and deontologists in general) would be
uncomfortable with the idea of even a vague “measure” of justice,
Wittman’s approach, if extended modestly, would enable analysis of the
trade-offs involved with retributivist punishment.
Next, in his aptly titled article Retributive Justice in the Real World,
Michael Cahill recognizes the conceptual difficulty of bridging
retributivism and utility, but he ends up suggesting that Wittman’s
optimism can be rendered operational through careful and flexible
149
adjustments in the schemes for distributing retribution. In proffering
his notion of “consequentialist retributivism,” Cahill virtually mocks
absolutist retributivism as a quixotic notion that is forced to engage in
self-limiting rationalizations to escape its inability to deal with human
150
error and scarce resources, and institutional agency costs. And as for
threshold retributivism, he decries it as abstract and metaphoric,
incapable of determining at what point in a real system of criminal
justice we can determine when the retributivism principle must arise to
151
Overall, he views most
rein in the forces of utilitarianism.
retributivism as too abstract to help us judge a criminal justice system
because it can at best tell us about the optimal punishment in individual
cases but is likely to do so only in the extreme cases at either end—from
torture to trivial cases.
In Cahill’s view, retributivism is a justifying principle of punishment
that insists that certain acts be punished and that posits at least degrees
and types of punishment for these acts. But Cahill would redefine
retribution as a general goal of punishment, not an obligation to
152
He says that we can thereby see retribution as an intrinsic
punish.
virtue to maximize as best we can, so we can create a fungible amount of
retribution that can be doled out according to conventional means of
148. Id. at 218–19.
149. See Cahill, supra note 113, at 836.
150. Id. at 828, 857. As he describes absolutist retributivism, it would at most take into
account the costs of apprehension and the risk of error in an effort to keep the net of
deserved punishment as wide as possible. Id. at 848. Moreover, in his view, absolute
retributivism believes that the degree of severity of a crime is irrelevant to the obligation to
punish it. Thus, when resources are scarce, the absolute retributivist will choose to at least
maximize the sheer number of crimes punished and will thereafter go after those easiest to
apprehend and most likely guilty—which may turn out to be such low-level criminals as
shoplifters. Id. at 849–50.
151. Id. at 858.
152. See id. at 851, 868.

15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

1234

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/18/2012 1:23 PM

[95:1203

rational government planning in the face of scarcity.153 In Cahill’s view,
the key step may involve taking an “agent-neutral” rather than an
154
Under an agent-relative
“agent-relative” approach to retributivism.
approach, where act and individual must be the measure for the right
punishment, we cannot escape the category of questions and
externalities that White poses, and the system is stuck with lumpy
inefficiencies that may thwart retribution. But in an agent-neutral
approach, we can aggregate individual “amounts” of desert into a whole,
and then do a cost–benefit analysis to ensure that we are getting the
maximum possible amount of punishment or “desert-based
155
punishment” at the lowest possible cost.
Thus, for Cahill, retributivism can take on questions of
implementation while also fending off possible criticism that mutual
contingency of various stages of enforcement and punishment doom the
coherence of the retributivist program. So long as we can stipulate that
a legislatively assigned punishment can fairly represent the deserved
punishment for a crime, we can then proceed to some simple
hypothetical calculations, and can do so by stages of enforcement. So
for example, suggests Cahill, if we look at the stage of police
investigation and apprehension, we can work up figures for the cost of
apprehending an offender, then the number of offenders, then the likely
false-positive error rate, and we then calculate the cost per “unit of
156
deserved punishment” and ask the police to find ways to maximize it.
The police need not get caught up with such questions as whether to
give all offenders some punishment while sacrificing some of the
punishment they deserve, or any other distribution or triage formula
which may also sacrifice individual desert. When prosecutors inherit
these police choices they can perform a parallel calculation. Even in the
face of such possible problems created by the police, Cahill’s good news
is that the legislature can holistically coordinate all these stages, for
example, by defining sentences so as to anticipate and account for the
157
allocation decisions by various actors. He claims that his model offers
both suppleness and precision because it can at least consider such
choices as the following: whether to emphasize severity or certainty;
153. Id. at 851.
154. Id. at 833.
155. Id. at 855.
156. Id. at 843.
157. Id. at 856. Thus, the legislature can set sentences higher if it is likely that
prosecutors will engage in aggressive plea-bargaining and perhaps also legislating procedural
rules to govern police and prosecutorial choices. Id.
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whether to aim for wider distribution of punishment as opposed to
triage; whether we should exhaust maximum punishment for serious
crimes before looking further down the culpability ladder; or whether
the optimizing device should focus error rates and apprehension costs
158
per category of crime regardless of its egregiousness.
In rebuttal to these efforts, Kenneth Avio insists that the
retributivist–utilitarian relationship exhibits a deep conceptual divide
that cannot be healed.
Avio reviews various efforts to marry
retributivism to utilitarian economics but concludes that “a plausible
efficiency-based rationale for finite punishment remains to be
articulated” and that “[p]unishments that simultaneously optimize and
159
He runs through the versions of
are deserved . . . may not exist.”
retributivism that purport to accommodate welfare or scarcity, but he
rejects each one as incoherent. He takes on the hybrid retributivism
160
inspired by Rawls and H.L.A. Hart, and later rearticulated by Sharon
Byrd: adherence to a strong deontic duty to punish but positing that
criminal law can be consequentialist in its overall purpose—to threaten
punishment so as to deter—but retributive in meting out punishment for
161
individual acts. As usually understood, this hybrid theory amounts to
the standard deterrence approach constrained by negative retributivism
(ruling out intentional punishment of the innocent, as well as
disproportionate penalties). But because of the equation of desert to
harm and the practical impossibility of consistent (much less full)
162
enforcement, this combination, in Avio’s view, is a conceptual failure.
For example, while few deterrence advocates would endorse deliberate
punishment of innocent persons, they do recommend disproportionately
high punishments to compensate for the uncertainty of apprehension
and prosecution (a standard result from the economics of crime). But
negative retributivists condemn excessive punishment of the guilty as

158. Id. at 821, 833–35.
159. K.L. Avio, Economic, Retributive and Contractarian Conceptions of Punishment, 12
L. & PHIL. 249, 259, 268 (1993).
160. Id. at 262–68.
161. Id.; see also B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat,
Retribution in Its Execution, 8 L. & PHIL. 151 (1989).
162. Treating hybrid retributivism as an effort to salvage a real world role for
retributivism, Avio insists that given the impossibility of punishing all deserving offenders in
accordance with the harm they cause and the various kinds of slippage within the system in
catching and convicting offenders in the first place, the logical demand of deterrence—that it
punish at the marginal level of sanction to the offender to match the marginal gain or harm of
the crime—is a fantasy in a real world criminal justice system. Avio, supra note 159, at 268.
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well as punishment of the innocent, and so would prohibit these
artificially increased penalties. In sum:
[P]unishment that is retributive in its execution (i.e., equal in
severity to the direct harm experienced by the victim) is
generally not credible as an effective threat as perceived by
rational prospective offenders.
[Hybrid retributivists]
insufficiently appreciate that the threat of punishment arises
from, and is communicated by, actually apprehending,
convicting, and punishing offenders. . . .
....
. . . Kantian retributive principles could not be taken
seriously if they were over-ridden by the need to attain a degree
of deterrence necessary for a consequentialist justification of
163
punishment.
Thus, Avio finds the reconciliation of retributivism and utility in
criminal justice virtually dead on arrival. That is, he stays within the
realm of fairly abstract theory, never venturing into the world of social
fact. But one can infer from his views that since retributivism cannot
harmonize with any approach to punishment meant to enhance utility he
would hardly be surprised that modern retributivism seems irrelevant to
mass incarceration. Or he might even argue an excessive commitment
to retributivism might even explain mass incarceration.
A subtle tonal variant on Avio’s skepticism comes from Mark
164
White acknowledges that there are ways of optimizing the
White.
amount of retribution a society exercises, and thus is somewhat less
165
In contrast to
concerned with abstract coherence than Avio.
Wittman’s “no problem” attitude, White treats optimizing efforts as
tragically, though not futilely, entailing sacrifices of justice, and his
premise is that a certain category of dilemmas are the true measure of
166
White’s predicate is that retributivists can purport to
the sacrifice.
retain a modicum of purity in the system by applying the principles
solely to the punishment of the convicted, relieving the agents of
apprehension and prosecution of any obligation to maximize

163. Id. at 267–68.
164. See Mark D. White, Retributivism in a World of Scarcity, in THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 253 (Mark D. White ed., 2009).
165. See id. at 266.
166. Id. at 254.
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retribution.167 But is it the case that only punishment of convicted
persons must adhere to retributivist principles, so that apprehension and
prosecution, which influence the probability of punishment, to be
optimized according to a purely utilitarian model? If so, the interactive
effects of these differential approaches would be complex and
unpredictable. For example, if retributive punishments for major crimes
are very high, the resulting higher prison costs might drain resources
from police and prosecutors and thus disserve crime prevention,
although these high penalties might have the secondary benefit of
increasing deterrence and thereby saving the budgets for these earlier
stages. But if we expand the domain of retributivism to cover both
punishment and prosecution, would we then not only have to punish all
convicted persons rightly for their crimes but also ensure that we
prosecute all probably guilty persons—and no innocent ones? Or do we
choose a theory of retribution that allows actors at various stages to
stress probability (frequency) of conviction rather than severity of the
charge or possible penalty? In the end, White fears that any attempt to
accommodate the cost or uncertainty of apprehension or prosecution
168
undermines the purity of the culpability measure.
4. A Critique of the Critiques
The attacks on retributivism for the alleged incoherence of its own
internal logic are well-established. Of course, none of the other
purposes of punishment can utterly free themselves of internal
incoherence, so the concern for abstract purity may be unfair. But even
if we proceed to somewhat less abstract concerns like the possibility of a
metric of proportionality, through the perspective of Western’s book,
retributivism seems feckless and irrelevant. There is no point in
discussing the abstractions and nuances of proportionality when in some
rough sense American punishment is so wildly disproportionate to
crime, whether we focus on crime and punishment in the collective sense
or in regard to the specific misconduct of individuals. There is little
point in discussing the moral desert of particular acts when in some
rough sense, we are long past the point of marginally identifying bad
acts to punish but instead use our penal laws to add new tranches of
offenders to a vast and self-reinforcing status. A key fallibility of
retributivism lies not in the failure to fine-tune adjustments of
punishment to desert, but in the close to universal mismatching of crime
167. Id. at 266–67.
168. Id. at 269.
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and punishment, as the formal sentence is multiplied in severity by the
169
aggregated earnings penalty and lifetime recidivism that imprisonment
produces. Punishment ostensibly based on bad acts may have so
thwarted the social and behavioral development of inmates that it
creates a demographic status that in turn becomes the cause of further
incarceration.
On the other hand, as for some of these newer critiques that demand
that retributivism account for social fact, let me repeat the punch I
telegraphed earlier: These critiques of—or corrections to—retributivism
that limit the challenge of social reality to resource constraint (or
procedural imperfection) stay far on the safe side of the challenge of
modern mass incarceration. There is little point in worrying about
scarcity of prosecutorial and correctional resources when, given this
disproportion, we spend an amount of money so far in excess of what
might be needed to sensibly address America’s demonstrable crime
problem that our resources might just as well be viewed as infinite. For
many years this observation has had a kind of technical economic truth
to it, given the tendency of states to use debt-delaying bond-issue
financing schemes for prison construction that placed corrections off the
books for normal budgetary purposes and thus outside the regular realm
170
But less technically, there is no point in
of political discussion.
worrying about whether American criminal justice is cogently motivated
by the purpose of retribution when the effects outrun any ostensible
purpose in the first place. Put another way, the system finesses the
scarcity problem by externalizing so much of its cost on the very group it
punishes, both in terms of the penalties for individual prisoners and the
collateral damage done to those on whom they depend.
Nor do the sensible-sounding compromises of “limiting
171
Aiming directly at the
retributivism” salvage this form of critique.
embedding of this in the new MPC of sentencing, Edward Rubin, who is
rare even among critics of retributivism for suggesting it is partly to
172
blame for mass incarceration, attacks on several fronts. First, Rubin
attacks the predicate notion of the modern story—that retribution at the
very least supplied a reliable metric for punishment that would correct
the subjectivity, hypercomplexity, and nonuniformity associated with
rehabilitation. He insists that it is a phantom argument to say that
169. WESTERN, supra note 1, at 125–26.
170. See Kevin Pranis, Doing Borrowed Time: The High Cost of Back-Door Prison
Finance, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 2008, at 1, 1–3.
171. See Rubin, supra note 92, at 18.
172. Id.
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desert supplies a reliable metric, since the moral judgment it entails may
not be limited to supposedly well-defined acts, but rather may have to
173
Second, in a rare move in
include many more contextual factors.
modern jurisprudence, Rubin notes that limiting retributivism cannot
possibly be applied to justify the recidivist sentences that account for a
significant portion of the incarceration rate in the United States today.
But most importantly, he argues that the mantra of limited retributivism
still gives aid and comfort to stronger retributivism as a valid
overarching theory of punishment. Indeed, despite the effort of modern
retributivists to distinguish their favored philosophy from atavistic
Hammurabian sentiments, it still “smolders with the spirit of revenge,”
and proponents of limited retributivism delude themselves if they think
174
that this taint can be “sanitized by philosophic argument.”
Rubin’s thesis is that overarching theories of punishment are
themselves an enemy of reform, as evidenced by the overreaction to
rehabilitation entailed by modern retributivism. He argues that the
rhetorical need to reject rehabilitation led its critics to understate its
175
utility when they invoked the “nothing works” trope and to offer
highly exaggerated complaints that rehabilitation posed a threat to the
176
personality and autonomy of the offender. The result was to ignore its
modest but crucial role in one arena—the arena of prison operation and
the value of rehabilitationist principles in mitigating abusive prison
177
A retributivist mindset among prison officials is not a
conditions.
healthy thing if it renders prison harsher—and is not even logically
178
entailed by retributivist philosophy anyway.
173. Id. at 33–34.
174. Id. at 41.
175. The phrase “nothing works” was made famous by sociologist Robert Martinson,
especially in his highly visible article What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 48. Even just a few years after that article, other social
scientists argued that the widespread absolutely negative view attributed to Martinson was a
misreading of his research. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, “What Works?” Revisited: New
Findings on Criminal Rehabilitation, 61 PUB. INT., Fall 1980, at 3, 3.
176. Rubin, supra note 92, at 73–81.
177. See id. at 66–82.
178. Id. As Rubin notes, proportionality, oddly enough, has the advantage of not being
a theory of punishment. Id. at 50. It is what Nozick calls a side-constraint to make
punishment fairer, regardless of whether the justifying motivation is some form of
utilitarianism or anything else. Id. at 33. Indeed, Rubin thereby salvages the Robinson–
Darley theory from the charge that it lends aid and comfort to harsh retributivists by treating
their view simply as an empirical way of assessing the political purchase of proportionality
and thereby gaining consent of the governed to whatever the ruling punishment theory is. See
id. at 63–64. And he adds with modest praise that the key advantage of proportionality of this
sort is that American criminal justice now relies almost exclusively on incarceration, as for

15 - WEISBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

1240

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/18/2012 1:23 PM

[95:1203

A final critical perspective on modern retributivism comes from
Jeffrie Murphy, in one of those rare essays that foundationally undoes
the very logic of a philosophy of punishment by mere reference to the
179
Murphy is concerned with one rationale for
state of social fact.
retributivism, the social contractarian notion that we have all implicitly
consented to a governing moral code, but his perspective undermines
the logic of retributivism more broadly. He argues that social
contractarianism’s premise is that people
are viewed as being part of a community of shared values and
rules. The rules benefit all concerned and, as a kind of debt for
the benefits derived, each man owes obedience to the rules. In
the absence of such obedience, he deserves punishment in the
sense that he owes payment for the benefits. For, as a rational
man, he can see that the rules benefit everyone (himself
included) and that he would have selected them in the original
position of choice.
. . . But to think that [this] applies to the typical criminal,
from the poorer classes, is to live in a world of social and
political fantasy. . . . [T]hey certainly would be hard-pressed to
name the benefits for which they are supposed to owe
180
obedience.
Murphy’s challenge, which predates mass incarceration, is based on
a general assumption of income inequality. As Western’s book makes
clear, the social facts of mass incarceration pose a challenge of a
different order of magnitude: Is it possible to defend an ethos of
individual responsibility when it is instantiated in a practice that has led
to the mass production of ruined lives? If the collateral social and
economic consequences of incarceration are so profound and
metastatically unpredictable, if they serve to multiply social and income
inequality, perhaps the matching of punishment to crime has become a
hopeless exercise. If so, then the traditional critique that retribution
must account for the fallibility of the institutions of justice misses the
point that the work of Western and others teach.

serious punishment, the arithmetic of time makes such judgment-sorting easier. Id. at 50.
179. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 3 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995).
180. Id. at 26.
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a. Incapacitation
Incapacitation would seem to be the least problematic of the
rationales of punishment, both theoretically and empirically. It rests on
the obvious point that a person in prison cannot commit crimes outside
of prison, and if we have decent information about the criminal
proclivities of an offender, we can reasonably estimate the number of
crimes prevented for a particular period of his life. Moreover, for the
same reason, among utilitarian rationales incapacitation seems
especially harmonious with retribution, since what it accomplishes
seems so closely allied to what the offender has done or is likely to do.
Of course, things are not all that neat. For one thing, it may be a matter
of chance what particular offense sends an offender to prison; moreover,
that particular offense may bear a weak relationship to the nature and
frequency of crimes he is likely to do if set free, or to the length of time
for which we can project his proclivities. Worse yet, a sentence
measured by those empirical speculations might bear little relation to
what the polity would see as a fair punishment for that offense. Indeed,
these concerns cause worry that the argument for incapacitation does
not easily distinguish away the knotty problem of “preventive
detention,” where the triggering information about an offender’s
proclivities might not be a convictable offense at all.
The stock story of the recent politics of the incarceration boom
focuses far more on retribution than incapacitation, but the common
political rhetoric of “public safety” surely implies that incapacitation is
salient in the minds of the polity. And the most obvious challenge that
mass incarceration poses to incapacitation is, as noted earlier, that the
continuing post-1990 spike in imprisonment seems to have accounted
for only a small fraction of the reduction in crime. But the problems of
incapacitation in a time of mass incarceration are still more complex.
The incapacitation justification for punishment was briefly publicly
ascendant in the 1970s, under the name of “selective incapacitation,”
181
championed by the neoconservative James Q. Wilson. Responding to
the crime wave of the era, Wilson argued that some humans had a
certain irreducible proclivity to commit crimes that was immune to
liberal do-good efforts to ameliorate the underlying social “causes” of
crime. Faced with this problem of original sin, the best the state could
do was to isolate criminals from potential victims. Wilson argued that
incapacitation could rely on criminological evidence to identify the

181. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 156 (2d rev. ed. 1983).
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likeliest criminals and likeliest recidivists, so that isolation could be
182
keenly parsimonious.
Most of the criticism of Wilson attacked his key empirical premises.
One complaint was about the quality of the social science predicting
future criminality on the basis of conventional criteria of personality and
past conduct, and that any machinery to implement such a scheme is
183
likely to be too informal, error prone, and not self-correcting.
Another was that claims that altering prison rates to achieve “selective
incapacitation” could reduce the crime rate grossly mismeasured the
amount of incapacitation, failing to account for eras where vast numbers
184
of antisocial people were held in mental hospitals. Another was about
the “replacement effect,” the concern that the premise of selective
incapacitation is flawed because the key variable affecting the number
of crimes is not the number of criminally inclined people on the streets
185
but the number of criminal opportunities.
These criticisms receive their richest empirical treatment from
Zimring and Hawkins in their 1995 book precisely titled
186
But Zimring and Hawkins attack the premises and
Incapacitation.
products of incapacitation in more foundational ways. They review the
strange shadow history of this concept in its relationship to the other
purposes of punishment and its salience in academic debate generally.
The gist of their argument is that selective incapacitation rose to some
prominence not because it had much intellectual or empirical
foundation, but because, along with deterrence, it served a default
function: For utilitarians, it was the best rationale available to fill the
187
Indeed, the selective version of
breach when rehabilitation faltered.
incapacitation theory won attention because it seemed so compellingly
logical, found support in available episodic studies for those disinclined
to do original research, seemed more demonstrable than deterrence,
182. Id. at 145–58 (examining the various studies and explaining that criminal justice
“operates by trying to predict future behavior”).
183. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 689, 711 (1995); see also Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal
Careers, 237 SCI. 985, 985 (1987) (describing the “considerable difficulty of observing directly
individual crimes or tracking carefully the patterns of offending by individual criminals in
order to collect reliable data”).
184. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1755 & fig.1, 1760–61 (2006).
185. See, e.g., KING ET AL., supra note 33, at 6 (explaining the replacement effect in the
context of the drug market).
186. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 92.
187. Id. at 3–4.
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and so was a mutual enabler with public safety policies.188 Zimring and
Hawkins assert that promoters of selective incapacitation were awkward
and hesitant in their research, rarely undertaking rigorous efforts to
189
break down their data in terms of subcategories of criminals.
As a result, Zimring and Hawkins argue, beyond all the conceptual
and empirical flaws in selective incapacitation, that the justifying
rationales for incapacitation in general terms, as an overall animating
190
Perhaps because it
purpose of punishment, have been neglected.
191
seemed mostly like a concession to the failure of rehabilitation,
perhaps because as a pure theory of punishment it has trouble finessing
the problem of preventive detention, incapacitation has never been
given general fundamental scrutiny. As a result, incapacitation’s
problems run well beyond the common attacks on Wilson’s promotion
of it. As Zimring and Hawkins point out, however, there have been
numerous empirical studies of selective incapacitation, yet these studies
have been remarkably episodic and noncumulative, and they have been
“dialectical,” in the sense of one study aiming to attack another, rather
than examining fundamental questions, and in some ways its proponents
192
In terms of
have proceeded more deductively than inductively.
specific empirical problems, Zimring and Hawkins question the ability
of criminologists to measure crime proclivity at any specific period. Just
to figure out how many crimes someone committed just before prison
requires finessing problems with such unreliable data as retrospective
official measurements and self-reporting surveys. Even if we can get
reliable information about this much-studied “window period”
occurring just before incarceration, mathematically projecting forward
from any such data is itself daunting, especially if the window period
itself does not usefully predict crime frequency in the next immediate
193
phase of the offender’s career.
As Zimring and Hawkins put it, incapacitation proponents tend to
be entranced by the notion of a “fixed lambda” between the crime rate
and the counterfactual crime rate absent prison, and do not consider the
social contingency of such a counterfactual, paying far too little

188. Id.
189. See id. at 97.
190. Id. at 12–13. Ironically, Bentham himself had briefly discussed incapacitation but
viewed it fairly dismissively as a weak partner to general deterrence. Id. at 19–21.
191. Id. at 61.
192. Id. at 38–41.
193. Id. at 83, 88–91.
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attention to modern theories of crime causation and motivation.194
Moreover, the promoters of selective incapacitation ignored a
worrisome array of types of endogeneity and interaction with other
punishment rationales that incapacitation might entail. For one thing,
they did not address the problem that the police and other agents of the
state are always themselves making predictions that will skew prison
populations toward higher risks. In addition, there is the problem of
diminishing returns—marginal changes in imprisonment are always
likely to focus on the least dangerous. Thus, under any regime, given
the uncontroversial necessity of imprisoning the most egregious
criminals, and the nonincarceration of the least dangerous offenders,
even a strong shift in Wilson’s direction is likely to work only at the
margin of middle-level offenders such that it is unlikely to significantly
affect the cost–benefit rationality of imprisonment. Further, it is
obvious that offending rates of low-level criminals may increase in
195
response to shorter sentences because of decreased deterrence.
Finally, in both conceptual and empirical terms, the proponents have
been clumsy in attempts to measure the costs that further crime would
impose. For example, Zimring and Hawkins say estimates of these costs
avoided may be improbably high because of some of the proxies drawn
from tort law. Indeed, they acidly remark that if such proxies are to be
used, then the most important incapacitation target in the United States
196
may be drunk drivers.
Ultimately, Zimring and Hawkins view incapacitation as a backup
utilitarian argument that, perhaps more than deterrence, was available
as an abettor of harsher criminal laws, especially recidivist laws and
prison expansion. Indeed, incapacitation laid out the conceptual
vocabulary that helped create law-and-order politics and Wilson’s work
became part of a more general neoconservative turn in American
intellectual culture in part because it so explicitly derided the individual
psychology of social causation questions that modern social science has
not accomplished much with. In any event, whatever efficiency one
might have hoped could be realized by better predictions of future
criminality has been obliterated by mass incarceration. In our recent
politics of incarceration, little value has been placed on accurate
predictions of recidivism. It also moots those predictions, by creating
social conditions that put all inmates at very high risk of an endless
194. Id. at 46.
195. Id. at 36.
196. See id. at 139, 141.
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return cycle, whatever individual propensity to recidivism they might
have shown in a different social context.
A final irony is that when forced to serve as a generally justifying
purpose of punishment, incapacitation cannot sustain its own integrity as
a purpose. Indeed, as it reverts to selectivity to save its integrity, the
irony is that the narrow targeting of selective incapacitation law would
seem to show that incapacitation is not the overall purpose. Rather, it
implicitly validates rehabilitation as a reverse default.
Consider one more angle on the unstable boundary of incapacitation
197
Binder has eloquently argued that the social
from Guyora Binder.
reality of prisoner-on-prisoner crime raises doubt about whether anyone
could truly believe that incapacitation is the goal of incarceration. The
promoters of selective incapacitation must assume either that crime
does not occur in prison, or prison crime simply does not count. The
former assumption has never been true, and in an era of overcrowding
wrought by the spike in imprisonment, the limited research suggests that
198
while sexual assault has garnered the most attention, the number of
199
“The prevalence of
criminal-on-criminal assaults is extremely high.
prison violence raises the question whether incapacitation theory is truly
concerned with reducing the risk of violent crime, or merely
200
redistributing its risk from innocents to past offenders.” The position
that only nonoffenders deserve protection from violence would seem to
be a principle of retributive desert rather than utility. Such segregation
of offenders not only sets them apart from “society” physically—it also
sets them apart from “society” symbolically, by implying that their
welfare does not count in totaling up the welfare gains and losses from
incarceration.

197. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER,
AND MATERIALS 56–58 (6th ed. 2008).

CRIMINAL LAW: CASES

198. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 3–5 (2001).
The reporting rates for sexual assault in prison may be less reliable than for non-sexual
assaults in prison and sexual assaults outside prison, but the consensus is that a significant
fraction of jail and prison inmates have been so victimized. See generally Alice Ristroph,
Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 139–49 (2006).
199. Although data on in-prison crime can never be very comprehensive or reliable,
studies do suggest that the rate of sexual assault is higher in prison than in the general
population. Furthermore, although it has not increased in recent years, the rate of sexual
assault has probably not declined. Compare ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09, at 5
(2010), with Jennifer L. Truman & Michael R. Rand, Criminal Victimization, 2009, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. (U.S. Dep’t Justice, Wash., D.C., 2010).
200. KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 196, at 57 (emphasis added).
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Binder’s and Zimring and Hawkins’ insights about how
incapacitation should be recharacterized as a mask over another
rationale for punishment jibes with one of Zimring and Hawkins’
cautions about these rationales generally,
that very often justifications for particular penal practices are
produced after their implementation and are rationalizations of
change rather than causes. One counter to the notion that
renewed emphasis on penal restraint caused larger numbers of
prisoners is the possibility that the considerable growth in prison
population was itself the cause of the voluminous rhetorical
output that accompanied it. These chicken-or-egg problems are
frequently encountered when we seek to unravel the relationship
between theory and practice in penal history, but they are not
201
easier to resolve because of their frequent recurrence.
b. General Deterrence
If one looks to theoretical commentary on deterrence that parallels
what we see on retribution (and the absence of which for incapacitation
was noted by Zimring and Hawkins), there is not much. No one doubts
that preventing crime is a legitimate government goal, and so theoretical
debates about general deterrence have usually been variants on the
more general debate between retributivism and utilitarianism: Is it
illegitimate to “use” a new offender for the purpose of deterring others
where the degree of punishment to send the deterrent message exceeds
the offender’s desert? Of course, the field of theoretical law and
economics, in the hands of such leaders as Steven Shavell and A.
Mitchell Polinsky, has made a massive intellectual investment in the
abstract modeling of marginal deterrent capacities of various types of
202
sanctions. Occasionally, one sees a fresh framing of the foundational
questions. Notably, Anthony Ellis tries to ground deterrence as a
species of collective self-defense against aggression by playing out the
203
He addresses a key
analogy to individual self-defense doctrine.
conceptual problem: even if the state can plausibly threaten harm to
deter offenses, that self-defense rationale does not obviously justify
actually enforcing the punishment after the threat failed to deter the
201. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 92, at 72–73.
202. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting
of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1999).
203. Anthony Ellis, A Deterrence Theory of Punishment, 53 PHIL. Q. 337, 337–38 (2003).
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particular offender.204 So Ellis tries out some creative finessing of this
issue, suggesting, for example, that in order to make the threat credible,
the state must precommit and irreversibly prearrange to execute the
205
punishment.
Such new forays into jurisprudence aside, the scholarship on general
deterrence is all about refinements in the empirical technology needed
to assess the deterrent effect. That assessment faces daunting challenges
in understanding psychology, but an old and still agreed-on standby in
this area is that insofar as the evidence supports deterrence effects,
certainty of punishment appears to have more effect than severity
because it is more salient for people with manifest higher discount
206
rates. But once we get past such general empirical observations, if we
work with ostensible correlations of changes in actual punishment and
crime rates, controlling the variables is massively complex. Much of this
work has been stuck in the perennial arena of the death penalty, where,
despite occasional new claims of solid proof of marginal deterrent effect
of executions, the limitations on the data have probably rendered the
207
Sometimes
hypothesis unproved and may be ultimately unprovable.
other natural experiments arise, and the necessarily spotty and episodic
studies of these events produce little clear evidence of a marginal
deterrent effect. Thus, David Lee and Justin McCrary took advantage
of data about the change in punishment due to reaching adult status—a
sharply discontinuous change in vulnerability to punishment readily
204. Id. at 338–39.
205. Id. at 340–41. Thom Brooks challenges Ellis’s theory for the imperfections of its
analogy between the individual and the collective: that self-defense-based deterrence is
irrelevant to nonviolent or victimless crimes, and that the excuse allowed for reasonable
mistakes in individual self-defense would have to work as justifications at the collective level.
In addition, complains Brooks, Ellis necessarily impurifies his deterrence theory with
retributivism when he contrives the crime of “failing to heed a deterrent warning” and when
he smuggles in a reasonableness limitation on the magnitude of the deterrent penalty. Thom
Brooks, On Ellis’s Deterrence Theory of Punishment, 92 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 594, 594–96 (2004).
206. See David P. Farrington et al., Changes in Crime and Punishment in America,
England and Sweden Between the 1980s and 1990s, 3 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 104, 128 (1994)
(noting that risk of conviction could alter crime rates but that more empirical research
seeking that correlation is necessary). Another wrinkle, in terms of specific deterrence and
the subjective experience of punishment, involves “duration neglect.” Paul H. Robinson, The
Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1089, 1096 (2010–2011). Some research “suggest[s] that it is both the maximum intensity
and the endpoint intensity that determine the remembered punitive bite, but that the
duration of punishment” has little effect, and that the perception of the punitive bite of
incarceration degrades over time. Id.
207. See John J. Donohue, III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death
Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (2009).
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perceivable by the relevant population—and they found little effect of
208
this supposedly strong government message. Deterrence research also
must stress that the real question is not about actual punishment but the
perceived threat of punishment. Thus, nuanced modern studies have
tried to isolate the perception variable, figure out whether to test the
variable among the general population or the criminal population, and
then examine how changes in actual punishment explain the changes in
perception.
A rich new study by criminologist Gary Kleck and his colleagues
came up with conclusions that will disappoint those who hope that
changes in actual punishment affect perceptions thereof to make much
209
difference. Kleck combines statistics on the actual severity, frequency,
and swiftness of penalties from a wide sampling of counties with surveys
210
of perceptions of residents of those counties. The analysis controls for
many possible influences on perception of punishment independent of
the actual facts, and the survey’s focus in particular is on self-identified
211
The result is a shockingly negligible relationship
former offenders.
between differences in punishment fact and differences in perception
212
thereof. The conclusion is that although the general deterrent effect
may operate at some base rate to reduce crime, changes in penal policy
or enforcement play little role in sending a message that crime does not
213
Indeed, although government might look to different, perhaps
pay.
better targeted and better publicized ways of delivering the message, a
lowering of penalties for many crimes is likely to leave any current
214
deterrent effect undiminished.
If punishment had a significant marginal deterrent effect, the high
visibility of harsh punishment in the form of mass incarceration should
itself have been a powerful force in reducing crime. But the empirical
research summarized by Western—that the post-1990 spike in
incarceration can only explain a small fraction of the simultaneous drop
215
in the crime rate—suggests otherwise. Most likely, we have reached
the point at which the baseline punishment in society is so high that
208. See David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005).
209. Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 623, 653–54 (2005).
210. Id. at 633.
211. Id. at 636–38.
212. Id. at 653.
213. Id. at 653–55.
214. See id. at 654.
215. See WESTERN, supra note 1, at 44.
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potential criminals are psychologically inured to additional deterrence.
But as Western has shown, the potential deterrent message is even
greater than what is captured by actual frequency or duration of
imprisonment given the lifetime comic and employment penalty of
incarceration as both an additional material penalty and a source of
stigma. Imagine the last twenty years of the imprisonment increase as
an experiment to see if there is a megadose marginal increment so large
that it shakes up perceptions in ways that Kleck did not find. If so, the
experiment failed.
B. Utilitarianism: Rehabilitation
The last of the traditional theories of punishment is rehabilitation,
and we have perhaps come too far to revive it as serious justification for
our system. We could have said that prisons successfully incapacitate if
we had ignored prisoner-on-prisoner crime, but this fact makes
rehabilitation no longer a realistic argument. When an inmate appears
less prone to crime upon release, the explanation statistically most likely
is simple aging. Modest improvements do come in prison through
simultaneous drug rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and educational
opportunities, and massive diversion of funds in this direction could be
salutary both to incarcerated persons and to the ideal of rehabilitation.
A broader conception of rehabilitation within our system of criminal
justice implicates community-based diversion, early-release legislation,
and evidence-based sentencing. Because of the resemblance these
efforts bear to the rehabilitative orientation of the American system of
criminal justice before the 1970s, jurisprudes tend to conceive the
216
But properly understood, the
movement in terms of rehabilitation.
use of alternative dispositions, as opposed to in-prison programs, is an
avoidance maneuver that betrays our tacit acknowledgement that the
217
effects of the system itself are not rehabilitative but criminogenic.
Distinct from both in-prison therapeutics and diversion from the
jailhouse is the promising recent use of “shock therapy” through what
218
has come to be called “smart punishment” or “motivational jail.” This
renaissance of rehabilitative sentiment began in the mid-2000s with

216. See Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415
(2012).
217. Id. at 421.
218. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1557 (2003).
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Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (Project HOPE).219
Under the direction of Judge Steven Alm, the program aimed to reduce
the burden that expensively harsh sentences foisted on the state’s
criminal justice system partly by “scaring” minor offenders back in
220
line. The movement proved successful enough that several states have
implemented similar policies preferring a response to criminal behavior
more like that of a concerned parent in correction than like that of a
221
retributivist government in punishment. But this phenomenon is not
precisely an exception to the functional obsolescence of rehabilitation in
a system of mass incarceration— corrective effects come from short and
controlled application of a medicine that still poisons in larger doses.
Rehabilitation results, apparently, from a tangible, credible threat of
further incarceration, and not from jail time itself.
The overall picture is that today’s programs that do succeed in
rehabilitation aim at avoidance of the system outright, mitigation of the
effects of time spent behind bars, and reentry of people whose lives the
system has damaged.
As Western notes, in the age of mass
incarceration, “rehabilitation” seems to have taken on this new
meaning—we no longer pretend that prison itself rehabilitates,
recognizing instead that reintegration of former prisoners just requires
222
rehabilitation from collateral damages.
The greatest promise for a true rehabilitation of rehabilitation may
lie in the recent push to base our approaches to criminal justice anew
upon empirical evidence, whereby judges use empirical data in an
“actuarial manner,” tailoring the disposition based not on vague
223
impressions but on concrete indicators. After all, alternative options
224
clearly do vary in how well they reduce crime. This may be an oddsounding idea, but what gives us new reason to hope for broader
acceptance of these “evidence-based” models is the recent realistic
recognition on both sides of the political aisle of mass incarceration’s
219. See generally Mark Schoofs, Scared Straight . . . by Probation, WALL ST. J. (July 24,
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121685255149978873.html.
220. Id.
221. See Nolan, supra note 218, at 1557.
222. See WESTERN, supra note 1, at 192–93.
223. See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336–37 (2011). For a good review of the
contemporary arguments for evidence-based approaches to prisoner reentry, see ROGER K.
WARREN, NAT’L INST. OF CORR. & NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES (2007).
224. See Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 797, 821 (2009).
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long-term untenability.225 Somehow, we must address the problem—if
evidence-based models work, all the better. The prerequisite will be
that our politicians abandon naïvely ideological intransigence regarding
the system as it stands.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tonry captures the ultimate difficulty of reconciling punishment
theory with practice in Hegel’s cautious, flexible view: “[E]quality
remains . . . the basic measure of the criminal’s essential deserts, but not
226
of the specific external shape which the retribution should take.”
Tonry’s elegant essay ends with an acerbic look at a legal academy in
which fashionable philosophies of punishment, especially liberal
hybridizations of retributivism, seem to “provide coherent, articulable
bases for assessing whether particular punishment policies, practices, or
227
decisions are just[,]” despite a great deficit of moral clarity: “Policies
have been adopted, and people punished under them, that cannot be
justified under any of the normative frameworks developed in the past
228
two centuries.”
Tonry refers us to the case of Ewing v. California, in which the
Supreme Court upheld a three-strikes sentence of life incarceration for
229
the theft of three golf clubs. Following its usual protocol to determine
whether this punishment violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual, the Court considered whether any traditional rationales of
punishment could support the sentence, deferring to the legislature
230
Tonry asserts bluntly that this sentence would have
when in doubt.
231
outraged Kant, Bentham, and every serious philosopher in between.
But of course, courts never really assess punishment on moral terms,
just on democratic terms—“contemporary conceptions of just
punishment are at best muddled and morally incoherent and at worst
non-existent. . . . Justice by plebiscite, however, is not a normative
232
conception of justice.”

225. Klingele, supra note 216, at 423–24.
226. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 129 (Allen W. Wood
ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
227. Tonry, Introduction, supra note 5, at 22.
228. Id. at 23.
229. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17–18, 30–31 (2003).
230. Id. at 24–25.
231. Tonry, Introduction, supra note 5, at 23.
232. Id. at 24.
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The United States has proved capable of reducing its incarceration
rate, as it did slightly in the late 1960s and early 1970s before today’s
233
Even as he became the leader of a new
major increase began.
conservative movement, Governor Ronald Reagan effected an amazing
34% decrease in California’s prison population largely through
expansion of probation and through more generous invocation of parole
234
and fewer revocations. Paradoxically, today’s politicians have gotten
somewhat ahead of academics toward reducing mass incarceration.
Budget problems have forced legislatures to arrange hushed truces on
demagoguery on crime, a lower rate of crime has pushed law-and-order
politics off the agenda in national elections, and some states have
reduced mandatory minimums for drug offenses—an infamous legacy of
235
the 1970s.
Moves toward national sanity in criminal justice are modest and
politically fragile. The conventional view is that mass incarceration is
here to stay for two primary reasons: First, as recent analyses have
shown, once incarceration reaches a critical level, the criminogenic
nature of the prison experience and the resilience of American
institutions of criminal justice in reabsorbing and recycling recidivists
236
(“net-widening”) reinforce the phenomenon; and second, although
drastic retrenchments have actually happened, as under Reagan in
California, incarceration numbers are now so great that proportional
237
Jurisprudes of
reductions have become politically infeasible.
punishment will never play a major role in our penal policy, but they can
do better than their current irrelevance by making theory face reality.

233. Gartner et al., supra note 41, at 292.
234. Id. at 292, 299.
235. Drug courts, diversion programs, and sentencing commissions now keep some lowlevel felons out of prison.
236. On how parole revocation has become the new major source of prison admissions
in California, see PETERSILIA, supra note 44, at 73–74. On the complexity and arbitrariness
of factors that determine parole revocation and thereby confound any meaningful notion of
recidivism, see Wilson, supra note 44; and Maxwell, supra note 44, at 519–20.
237. Gartner et al., supra note 42, at 313–14.

